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Acquisition by processing:
A modular perspective on
language development*
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National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan
MIKE SHARWOOD SMITH
Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh
The paper offers a model of language development, first and second, within a processing perspective. We first sketch a
modular view of language, in which competence is embodied in the processing mechanisms. We then propose a novel
approach to language acquisition (Acquisition by Processing Theory, or APT), in which development of the module occurs as
a natural product of processing activity, without any acquisition mechanisms as such. The approach is illustrated and
explicated through examples of the development of content words, derivational morphology, the functional category I with its
variable features, and Case and thematic roles, as well as apparent cross-linguistic variation in processing strategies and the
status of bootstrapping in the model. We then examine some possible applications to issues in second language acquisition –
noticing the gap, the initial state, transfer, and the apparent limits of SLA – and finally offer a broader perspective on the
model: its scope, its relations to other approaches, and its possible limits.
Language acquisition must surely provide us with a classic
example of a multidisciplinary field. Its multidisciplinary
character exposes it to two inherent risks. Firstly, some
relevant domains might simply not yet be sufficiently
developed to yield important insights. The second risk
is that some relevant domains ARE sufficiently developed
to impact usefully on acquisition studies but have been
developed independently of one another with their own
conceptual framework(s) and methodological traditions,
impeding easy cross-fertilization.
The aim of our project is to build a cross-disciplinary
platform which can bring together research on linguistic
structure and research on general cognition, all framed
within a real-time processing perspective, and which, in
the process, can generate new insights of its own. We
necessarily capitalize on more established research and
especially on certain proposals that already have a strong
interdisciplinary character. The proposed model has two
parts, as it seeks to integrate, with modifications, two
major theoretical positions elaborated by, respectively,
Ray Jackendoff and Bernard Baars (e.g. Baars, 1988,
1997; Jackendoff, 1999, 2002). Here we focus on the
first part. Even more specifically, we focus on the
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essential features of our main proposal, ACQUISITION BY
PROCESSING THEORY (APT).
We first look specifically at the core of linguistic
ability as a constellation of dedicated processors. We then
consider the process by which it develops, i.e. first and
second language acquisition, proposing a parsimonious
approach. This seeks to explain linguistic development as
much as possible in terms of on-line processing, without
reference to mechanisms existing specifically for the
purpose of acquisition. The discussion will conclude with
a look at some applications to issues in second language
acquisition (SLA).
The language module
This section sketches a modular account of language,
both L1 and L2, focussing on Jackendoff’s (1987, 1997,
2002) version of modularity and, within that version,
Carroll’s (1999, 2001) view of input processing. We also
make reference to aspects of Principles and Parameters
(P&P) theory (Chomsky, 1986; Haegeman, 1994) and
Chomsky’s (1995) minimalist idea that cross-linguistic
variation regarding the module is restricted to the lexicon.
Background
There is considerable evidence that the mind is composed
to a large extent of functionally specialized processors,
or MODULES, though disagreement exists in many areas
(see, for example, Fodor, 1983, 2000; Jackendoff, 1987,
1997, 1999, 2002; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). We will favor
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Figure 1. The language module and adjacent cognitive systems: a first sketch.
Jackendoff’s conceptualization because it provides an
architecture of language in a ‘competence’ sense that can
be readily related to accounts of processing and because it
is explicitly concerned with interfaces between language
and other aspects of cognition.
Jackendoff’s system includes INTEGRATIVE PROCESSORS,
which build complex structures from the fragments of
structure fed into them during processing, and INTERFACE
PROCESSORS, responsible for replacing the code of one
module with the corresponding code of an adjacent
module in a chain accounting for phonological, syntactic,
and conceptual/semantic structure (PS, SS, and CS,
respectively). For example, integrative syntactic processes
simply build syntactic structure within the syntactic
module, using syntactic structures which are in syntactic
working memory. Each integrative processor recognizes
only its own code. The interface processors respond
to activated (phonological or conceptual) structures
outside the syntactic module and locate and activate
corresponding syntactic structures for the syntactic
processor to work on.
Jackendoff’s theory provided the foundation for
Carroll’s (1999, 2001) challenging new approach to SLA.
Carroll argued convincingly that a theory of acquisition
must be placed within an account of language processing,
and proceeded to construct such a theory for SLA, using
Jackendoff’s architecture. In what follows, we adopt
Carroll’s insight (along with Jackendoff’s architecture)
while differing greatly from her in its realization.
The processing chain and working memory
Figure 1 presents a simplified picture of the language
module and some adjacent portions of the cognitive
system. At its heart is a chain of sub-modules, responsible
for processing language. We focus, here and below, on
the syntactic portion. We treat the syntactic processor,
chiefly responsible for building syntactic structure on-
line, as invariant (see Crocker, 1996; Dekydtspotter,
2001). Morphosyntactic acquisition occurs within the
lexical sub-modules and possibly the interface processors,
within the constraints imposed by UG. The final product
of linguistic processing is its contribution to the MESSAGE,
which synthesizes the language module’s output – a con-
ceptual representation – with information from non-
linguistic sources written in a generic code compatible
with outputs from various domains, such as vision.
Figure 1 is elaborated in Figure 2 to incorporate our
view of Jackendoff’s (1987, 1997) Working Memory. It is
shown, simplistically, as a two-layer space representing
two levels of activation. The lower level represents
a resting level and the upper represents the elements
temporarily raised above that level, i.e. those in
working memory. The representation is simplified in
that each item actually has its own resting level and
activation behavior. Working memory is often discussed
as a ‘blackboard’, used to write (store) information
temporarily during processing. But a consensus now
exists among psychologists that it is not a location, as
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 24 Feb 2012 IP address: 131.174.248.180
Acquisition by processing 3
[speech/writing/
signing/Braille]
MESSAGE
MESSAGE
FORMULATION/
MESSAGE
ANALYSIS
NON-LINGUISTIC
SOURCES OF
INFORMATION
Conceptual
Processor
Conceptual
(generic)
Structures
SENSORY
INPUT
LANGUAGE
MODULE
Syntactic
Structures
Phonological
Structures
Phonological
Processor
Syntactic
Processor
syntactic
module
phonological
module
OUTPUT
LEGEND
SS/CC INTERFACE PROCESSOR
[INTERFACE PROCESSORS]
MOTOR
PROCESSORS
ACOUSTIC/AUDITORY
PROCESSORS
= integrative processor
= interface  prcessor
= information store+working memory
PS/SS INTERFACE PROCESSOR
Figure 2. The language module: a second sketch with memory added.
etc
visual
structure
Graphological
Structure:
Tactile
structure:
LAMP
‘Episodic memory’
structures of a lamp
LEGEND
PS = Phonological Structure
SS = Syntactic Structure
CS = Conceptual Structure
CSSS
Language module
PS
Conceptual
structure of
lamp
Morphosyntactic
structure of lamp
[+N] [-V]
[+Nom], etc
Phonological
structure of
lamp (all possible interconnections not represented here)
Figure 3. The modularized lexicon within and beyond the language module.
suggested by ‘storage’ and ‘blackboard’ (Miyake and
Shah, 1999). It is, rather, a transient pattern of activation
of elements within long-term memory stores, possibly in
novel configurations. In the case of language, the long-
term stores are the lexicon.
The lexicon
A lexical entry is a linking via interface processors of
structures in the different sub-lexicons, as in the example
of lamp in Figure 3, which also shows some of the many
other connections outside the language module. The PS
consists of the entry’s phonological form, while the SS
contains its syntactic category and any additional features
relevant to its use by the syntactic processor. The CS
represents its meaning in terms of conceptual structure.
Examples of elements in SS are features underlying a
word’s syntactic category and the count–mass distinction.
Most important for the discussion below are the functional
categories (fc’s), which establish the framework for
a syntactic representation (see, for example, Ouhalla,
1991; Chomsky, 1995); examples are tense, inflection,
determiner, agreement, complementizer, and negation.
They are language-specific instantiations of universal
properties.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 24 Feb 2012 IP address: 131.174.248.180
4 J. Truscott and M. Sharwood Smith
The conceptual (sub-)lexicon contains universal pro-
perties in the form of innate conceptual primitives. (For
Jackendoff’s theory, see Jackendoff, 1990.) Because the
CS is written in generic conceptual code, it can be
synthesized with non-linguistic information associated
with the item’s use. CS, though crucial to language, is
thus not part of the language module; it is best seen
as chunks of generic conceptual knowledge copied to a
language-related store (CS) and connected to an SS and
a PS. This removal of CS from the language module fits
with the extensive evidence that lexical meaning has a very
different status from other aspects of lexical knowledge,
especially that it is acquired much more explicitly (Ellis,
1994).
The place of an L2 in the language module
SLA research has found considerable similarity with L1
acquisition and good evidence of UG availability, but
also significant contrary evidence (e.g. Flynn, 1987; Bley-
Vroman, 1988; Clahsen and Muysken, 1989; White, 1989;
Zobl, 1990; Uziel, 1993; Poulisse, 1999). A processing-
oriented framework treats all these findings as products
of the processing system. If one assumes a shared
system, the similarities are expected and the differences
may be explained by the presence of a second set of
linguistic items co-existing with and competing with the
first (see below), plus the much richer metalinguistic
(extra-modular) knowledge that typically accompanies
SLA. If the two languages involve fundamentally dis-
tinct processing systems, differences and lack of UG
availability are straightforwardly explained; but contrary
evidence is troublesome. The assumption of a shared
processing system also offers parsimony, allows direct
application of current linguistic research to SLA, and
provides a straightforward approach to incorporating the
ideas of competition between languages: two knowledge
bases are competing for access to a single processing
system.
For these reasons, we adopt the assumption that, apart
from new structures, distributed over the sub-lexicons,
and possibly the addition of new lexical processes at
the interfaces, the same architecture is involved in
acquisition and use of an L2 as in acquisition and use
of an L1. In general, our proposals therefore apply to
both L1 and L2 acquisition. The distinct L1 and L2
lexical structures are clearly interconnected (e.g. Poulisse,
1999; Kroll and Tokowicz, 2001), their distinct status
depending only on language-specific tagging (cf. Poulisse
and Bongaerts, 1994). This conception of the bilingual
mind raises interesting questions about how the L1 enters
into L2 use, with important implications for transfer
and other prominent issues in SLA, which we consider
below.
Conclusion: The scope of ‘language module’
Where, then, is ‘the language module’? We will continue
to speak of one, though in important respects it is not
a Fodorian module but has the ‘molecular’ structure
specified by Jackendoff, with some aspects of language
use subserved by processors linked to, but not part of the
module. A natural view is that it consists of those elements
that are directly attributable to UG and came into existence
(phylogenetically) primarily because they contribute to the
function of language use. Included are the phonological
and syntactic integrative processors and the inter-
face processors linking them together and linking the
module to auditory and conceptual processors. Also inside
are the PS and SS stores. Excluded from the module is
any grammatical, pragmatic, or other knowledge obtained
by mechanisms that are not specifically linguistic, along
with the linguistic conceptual processor, the message
processor, and the auditory/acoustic processor(s), because
they deal extensively with non-linguistic information,
presumably using a generic code.
Acquisition by processing
We now offer a model of the language module’s
development, seeking to explain the process with minimal
appeal (ideally none) to mechanisms existing specifically
for the purpose; changes are to be seen as lingering effects
of processing. We focus on morphosyntactic development
and secondarily on conceptual development.
Processing by the language module
The process
The rich literature on processing is frequently charac-
terized by conflicting and ambiguous findings on central
issues, so every account of processing is controversial.1
We will suggest a view which we believe is at least
compatible with major findings.
One highly controversial issue is the degree and
nature of interaction between syntactic and conceptual
processing, views ranging from Frazier’s (1979) modular
approach to the unrestricted interaction of McClelland,
St. John, and Taraban (1989). The logic of a hypo-
thesized separation between syntactic and semantic
processing, fitting with our modular approach, is that
this specialization allows extremely efficient processing
at each level. The existence of an independent syntactic
processor is suggested by evidence that syntactic struc-
tures can be primed independently of semantic factors
(e.g. Bock, 1986; Branigan, Pickering, Liversedge,
Stewart, and Urbach, 1995) and by studies of self-paced
1 Questions also arise about the application of reading research, which
dominates this literature, to a modular approach like ours.
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reading and eye movements during reading (Frazier and
Rayner, 1982; Ferreira and Henderson, 1990; Rayner,
Garrod and Perfetti, 1992). Research on Event Related
Potentials indicates that syntactic processing and semantic
processing are distinct, requiring a specifically syntactic
representation (see Brown and Hagoort, 2000). But the
case for some interaction cannot be dismissed (e.g.
Steedman and Altmann, 1989; MacDonald, Pearlmutter,
and Seidenberg, 1994).
One relatively clear finding is that semantic charac-
teristics of a sentence can affect processing long before
the end of the sentence is reached (e.g. Swinney and
Hakes, 1976; Tyler and Marslen-Wilson, 1977; Traxler
and Pickering, 1996). Thus, conceptual processing does
not wait for syntactic analysis to be completed; results
of syntactic processing are presented to conceptual
processors INCREMENTALLY.
Much less clear is whether syntactic processors pro-
duce analyses serially or in parallel. Parallel processing
is suggested by findings that properties of a dispreferred
analysis produce priming effects (Hickok, 1993; Nicol and
Pickering, 1993), indicating that this secondary analysis is
present. Meng and Bader (2000), noting that experimental
evidence for serial processing is disputed, produced novel
evidence for it, but noted that parallel models can handle
their results if they include early cutoff of unpromising
analyses. There is also reason to think that the reanalysis
mechanisms usually associated with serial models are
necessary (Lewis, 2000), but early cutoff again allows
parallel approaches to remain viable: reanalysis is the
resurrection of a rejected analysis after all else fails.
Putting these themes together, a reasonable conclusion
is something like the incremental-interactive theory
(IIT) of Crain and Steedman (1985), Altmann and
Steedman (1988), and Steedman and Altmann (1989)
(see also Gorrell, 1995), adapted to the architecture des-
cribed above. The syntax overgenerates, producing mul-
tiple possible representations in parallel, without reference
to conceptual information. Throughout this process
the SS/CS interface writes on CS whatever partial
representations it can write based on what the syntactic
processor has so far produced. When the conceptual
processor rejects one of these CS representations,
breaking the temporary connections of which it is formed
and lowering the activation levels of its component
items, the SS/CS interface does the same with the SS
representation on which it was based. Thus, interaction
between syntactic and conceptual processing consists of
autonomous (over)generation by the syntax with selection
among the possibilities at the conceptual level.
In adopting this leading idea of IIT, we do not adopt the
details of the theory. There is reason to believe, first, that
the selection process is not ENTIRELY conceptual but also
involves syntactic factors (Mitchell, Corley and Garnham,
1992). The details of IIT’s conceptual selection process
have sometimes proven problematic as well (e.g. Hickok,
1993; Nicol and Pickering, 1993).
The need for a notion of activation level is widely
accepted in processing research (e.g. McClelland and
Rumelhart, 1981; Bock, 1986; Dijkstra and van Heuven,
1998). We define an item’s CURRENT ACTIVATION LEVEL
as its resting level plus any additional activation it has
received from a processor during the current processing.
Its RESTING LEVEL is determined by the extent of its
past use (and possibly by innate specification in some
cases; see below). Increased activation of a feature and its
values follows from increased activation of the item it is
associated with.
During comprehension, potentially relevant items at
PS have their activation levels raised by the interface
processor connecting phonological structure to (non-
linguistic) auditory processing. The PS/SS interface then
raises the levels of the corresponding items in SS,
leading the SS/CS interface to do the same with their
CS counterparts. Each type of information about the
selected word is thus made available for processing at
the appropriate level. Throughout, the three types are kept
in registration through their common indexes.
Additional items are activated by a processor when
it finds a need for them. In particular, syntactic repre-
sentations require functional categories, which often have
no phonological form and therefore do not receive any
activation in the way just described. In a sentence such
as ‘They walk to work’, for instance, the fc I (Inflection)
must be present to satisfy UG-based conditions on well-
formedness for the representation, but nothing in the
phonological form of the utterance indicates its presence.
A processor uses the most active items at its level at a
given moment to construct its representations. Sometimes
this includes assigning indexes to empty nodes and thereby
creating new items. When a processor rejects a given
item or feature value, it reduces the current activation
level to its original resting level. Those that are not
rejected maintain their elevated levels through the current
processing activity. This contrast will be central to the
discussion below.
Production in the model involves the same items and
mechanisms as comprehension, consistent with findings
that activation of a syntactic structure in comprehension
can prime it in production (Branigan, Pickering, and
Cleland, 2000; Pickering, Branigan, Cleland, and Stewart,
2000). A message formulated in the code of generic
structures leads to increased activation of those items
in conceptual structure that could potentially be used in
expressing the message through language. Once these
items become especially active, the SS/CS interface
processor similarly activates their coindexed counterparts
in SS, leading the PS/SS interface to do the same with the
coindexed items in PS. Each integrative processor works
to build a legitimate representation, in its own code, by
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connecting some of these items along with any others it
needs in order to produce an acceptable representation.
In the process, it reduces the levels of items that turn out
to be unsuitable for the utterance. The end result is that
exactly those items that are ultimately selected will stand
out in terms of activation.
An example
We will briefly present one of Jackendoff’s (1997,
pp. 104–105) examples of processing, with limited
adjustments, as our approach largely follows his in this
respect. Suppose the processing system must deal with
the following sentence:
(1) It was only apparent, not real.
Assuming an American pronunciation of apparent,
disambiguation of ‘a parent’ versus ‘apparent’ and
rejection of the wrong candidate only occurs at a late stage.
The phonology processor establishes both possibilities,
leading the PS/SS interface to activate all items in SS
that are coindexed with any of the PS items used, which
then leads the SS/CS interface to do the same with the
corresponding items in CS. For the case of ‘a parent’, the
processors must also temporarily connect the two items.
The syntax processor has no problem with the input
it receives from the phonology. Both candidates are
well-formed even after the final fragment (‘not real’)
is processed. However, the conceptual processor, when
the ‘not real’ fragment is processed, requires the phrases
following only and not to form a contrast. Accordingly,
it rejects ‘a parent’, reducing the current activation of the
items to resting levels. The SS/CS interface then does the
same with the SS representation on which it was based. It
is therefore ‘apparent’ that is used for construction of the
message.
The lingering effects
The representations produced during processing are
temporary creations, lasting only long enough to allow
construction of the message. But some of their effects
linger. We hypothesize two such effects.
The first involves activation levels. If an item or feature
value has its current level raised by a processor and the
increased level is maintained throughout the parse, the
lingering effect is a small lasting increase in its resting
level, the effect of which is that it becomes more readily
available for future processing (because, again, processors
use the currently most active items and current activation
is determined in part by resting activation levels). In the
preceding example, the PS, SS, and CS items that make
up the word apparent undergo a small increase in their
resting levels, but a and parent will return to their original
levels; their status in the system has not changed.
The other type of lingering effect involves the addition
of new items and alterations in old ones. If construction of
an adequate representation for the current input requires
a processor to establish a new item in SS (for example)
or to alter the features of an existing item, it does so,
purely for the purpose of processing the current input. If
these changes are not undone during the parse and the
representation in which they appear is not rejected, they
remain in SS afterward. But if they are rejected during
the parse, they quickly decay, meaning that no change (no
learning) occurs. Again, we hypothesize this rejection as a
normal means of removing inappropriate candidates from
the current parse; it is not a learning mechanism.
Jackendoff (1997) argued that a rejection process of
this sort must be part of normal processing. In the example
just considered, the phonology processor itself cannot
distinguish apparent from a parent; the distinction can
only be made at the conceptual level. But the phonology
processor does end up with only apparent, as shown by
the fact that we subjectively hear one word, not two. It
follows that rejection messages are passed from CS to PS,
suggesting that a parent has been removed. A possible
alternative (less appealing because it fits poorly with
IIT) is that acceptance messages are sent down, further
raising the current levels in the analysis that was not
rejected, making this analysis stand out from those that
were rejected.
Evidence regarding removal of SS candidates is more
difficult to obtain, but the claim appears testable. If
priming is the persistence of high current levels after
a parse is completed, syntactic items present in a
rejected analysis but not in the accepted analysis should
not show priming effects that last beyond the current
parse, because their activation levels will have been
lowered by this point. This prediction might be tested
with the procedure used by Branigan, Pickering, and
Cleland (2000), involving dialogue between a subject
and a confederate (perhaps in a written version). If the
confederate uses the sentence ‘The floor was uncovered
wood’, the subject’s syntactic processor should construct,
along with the correct analysis, an alternative involving
passive, which should be quickly rejected. Because the
processor has removed the passive (see below for our
account of passive), this sentence should not make the
participant more inclined to produce passive sentences
afterward; syntactic priming should not occur. If there is
no removal mechanism, priming should occur.
As production involves essentially the same
representation-building process as comprehension, except
in reverse, it should also result in lasting changes, though
only of the first type. The items used in production
are established through comprehension, which provides
the necessary information. Thus the long-term effect of
production is to selectively raise resting levels of already
existing items and their feature values.
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Content words
We illustrate these ideas, first, by looking at the acquisition
of content words. Suppose the learner encounters the
utterance ‘The horse is beautiful’ and the language system
does not yet have any items corresponding to horse.
Focussing on the higher levels of the processing chain,
we will simply assume that the phonology is able to parse
its input into words, in this case including one that did not
exist prior to the parse and therefore gives rise to a new
PS item, corresponding to horse.
The creation of this new item leads the PS/SS interface
processor to establish a counterpart for it in SS, by
coindexing it with an initially empty SS item. The
interface also activates the SS items corresponding to
the other words in the sentence, resulting in the proto-
representation Art–?–V–A on SS, with each item bearing
an index that ties it to the corresponding PS (and CS)
items. To construct a syntactic representation for this
input, the syntactic processor must assign a category to
the new item and integrate it with the other items without
violating UG constraints (embodied in the processor), and
respecting the order of items in the proto-representation.
Assuming that some basic syntactic development has
already occurred, the processor should assign the category
N to ‘?’ because doing so allows the creation of a
representation in which the article is paired with a
following N and a complete NP subject is present. The
processor thus raises the activation level of the new item’s
[+N] feature and lowers that of [+V], resulting in lasting
changes in their resting levels. The changes are small,
and therefore subject to reversal if future input requires
it for construction of successful representations. But for
the case of horse future input will generally result in the
same category assignment, further raising the resting level
of [+N] and lowering that of [+V], i.e. strengthening its
status as a noun.
As the syntactic representation is being produced, the
SS/CS interface uses it to establish a proto-conceptual
representation on CS, including an empty item coindexed
with the PS and SS for horse. Using this information, the
conceptual processor must produce a complete conceptual
representation for the sentence, which requires it to assign
the new item a meaning. The likely source is contextual
information, which is not available at SS but is at CS. If the
speaker is pointing to or looking at a horse, for example,
this information could allow the appropriate chunks of
conceptual knowledge to be copied onto CS and coindexed
with the new PS/SS, establishing the CS for horse.
Other syntactic and conceptual features of a word
can develop in much the same way. An input sentence
such as ‘Pat hit Chris’, for example, should lead the
syntactic processor not only to strengthen the V status
of hit (raise [+V] and lower [+N]), but also to assign it
a [transitive] feature or, if one is already present, raise
its current level and therefore its resting level (assuming
that neither the feature nor the representation in which it
appears is rejected during the parse). The reason is simply
that these features are necessary for an adequate syntactic
representation for the input. Similarly, the conceptual
processor can only construct an acceptable representation
if it assigns hit a suitable theta grid, specifying the thematic
roles of its accompanying arguments. In this case the grid
must include a hitter (agent) and a hittee (patient). So
the processor writes these features on the CS for hit. We
return to thematic roles below.
We have so far abstracted away from the parallel
character of processing. The syntactic processor routinely
constructs additional representations for its input, in
parallel. It might, for example, try to construct a repre-
sentation for ‘The horse is beautiful’ in which horse is an
adverb, like really, and the subject N is non-overt, along
the lines of ‘(These creatures are ugly, but) those [Ne]
really are beautiful’. But typically all these attempts fail
to produce fully acceptable representations at either SS or
CS (as in the example of ‘a parent’).
Derivational morphology
When the system encounters unhappy for the first
time, the phonology module produces two alternative
representations in parallel, one treating it as a single
unanalyzed novel word, /@nhœpi/, the other as the novel
item /@n/ plus the existing /hœpi/ (assuming that happy
has already been acquired). For each case, it establishes a
new entry for the novel item, each of which then acquires
an initially empty SS and CS.
The fate of the two new entries depends on which
representation survives, which depends on how successful
the syntax processor is in producing from it an accept-
able syntactic representation and how successful
the conceptual processor is in producing from that
representation an acceptable conceptual representation.
The un+happy analysis has an advantage in that it can
make use of the information already contained in the entry
for happy, at all three levels, which should contribute to
the success of the representations in which it appears. If
the ultimate set of representations uses the un entry but
not the unhappy entry, the latter fades, either disappearing
entirely or remaining with a very low resting level, because
the processing system rejected it. The un entry remains,
with an initially low resting level, which future use should
raise considerably.
This example can be contrasted with the processing of
until or unto. Here a decompositional analysis is unlikely
to produce successful conceptual representations, so only
the holistic forms should survive. Thus, semantically
transparent words, such as unhappy, are much more likely
to be stored in decomposed form than more opaque words,
as found by Marslen-Wilson, Tyler, Waksler, and Older
(1994).
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Nothing prevents the system from establishing both
analyzed and unanalyzed forms, especially when the
complex form is encountered first and the stem form
is only acquired later, so this account predicts the
presence of some redundant storage, as in dual-route
models (e.g. Laudanna and Burani, 1985; Chialant and
Caramazza, 1995). It also predicts that experience with a
derivational affix will make the affix more available for
future processing; frequency of the affix should thus be
associated with its availability in processing.
The SS and CS for un (and possibly for unhappy)
develop in essentially the same way as those for content
words. The CS can come from non-linguistic information:
learners who hear unhappy in context can often judge
that its meaning is the opposite of happy and that un
therefore means ‘the opposite of’, allowing that chunk
of conceptual knowledge to be copied into CS and
coindexed with the appropriate PS and SS. Assignment
of features to the SS – containing the information that
it is a prefix and attaches to adjectives – results from
characteristics of the morphosyntactic context. In order to
construct an acceptable representation involving unhappy,
the syntactic processor must write these features on the un
SS. They will then remain after the parse is complete, with
initially low resting levels, which will be raised whenever
future processing uses the features.
Conclusion
This approach does without some familiar concepts
related to acquisition. This is the primary respect in which
we diverge from Carroll’s (1999, 2001) approach. The
notion of Language Acquisition Device (LAD) has no
independent place in the model but is rather an abstraction,
reifying various processes involved in the development of
the language module. Similarly, we have no notion of
processing mechanisms turning things over to separate
learning mechanisms when they cannot do their job
(‘failure-driven’ acquisition). In our model there are no
learning mechanisms as such in the language module,
only the lingering effects of processing within an innately
constructed performance system.
Acquisition by processing: Functional categories
The heart of syntactic variation is the set of fc’s provided
by UG, each with its own variable features. In discussing
their development, we first present an overview of the
process and then examine two examples: the category I,
along with two parameters associated with it, and then
Case and thematic roles.
In general
The essence of an fc is an innately specified SS, pre-
existing in the sense that the syntactic processor, as an
instantiation of UG principles, writes it on SS when
dealing with appropriate input. The set of variable features
and possible values for them pre-exists in the same sense –
the processor by nature writes on the fc’s in SS those
needed to make the current parse succeed.
The CS is similarly inherent in the conceptual
processor and the SS/CS interface. When an fc is written
on SS, the interface then writes a coindexed item on
CS and the conceptual processor assigns it whatever
features and values are needed for the current parse. These
features and values are probably best seen as semantic
primitives, or combinations of them, which can be copied
into CS to serve as meanings for fc’s (cf. Slobin’s, 1985,
‘grammaticizable notions’). The possibilities are strongly
constrained by UG, though not so strongly as to rule out
variation. The English tense system, for example, does
not use the [future] feature (i.e. it is not copied into the
portion of CS coindexed with the tense SS), while Spanish
does.
If the syntactic processor is to write a particular cat-
egory on SS, it must recognize that it needs that category,
with a particular feature value, to handle its current input.
But without considerable syntactic and lexical context this
may be impossible. So acquisition of some content words,
including their syntactic characteristics, must precede
development of fc’s.
But once suitable contexts can be constructed, fc’s
should become relatively easy to deal with. The processor
is set to put them into its representations, so when its input
contains the appropriate clues, determined by UG, it does
so. Similarly, construction of syntactic representations
requires activation of an appropriate feature value of the fc,
and the syntactic processor is designed to determine which
of the limited possibilities best fits with the representation
it is building. Increases in the resting level of the SS and
CS items come from their continuing use by the processors
in constructing representations.
Establishment of an fc’s PS is quite different,
resembling that of content words. A given functional
CS can have several distinct PSs (e.g. English past
tense can be realized as [d], [t], or [Id]), each initially
entered into the lexicon independently of the others.
A new PS can be connected to the SS (and CSs)
when the PS/SS interface registers the correspondence
between the two in the phonological and syntactic
representations constructed during a parse and coindexes
them accordingly. Once again, this change occurs as part
of normal processing; no learning mechanisms as such are
involved.
Inflection (I)
To illustrate these points, we now consider in more detail
the development of the fc I in English.
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The item
I is innately present in that the syntactic processor by
nature writes it on SS whenever possible. But in the
early stages of learning the processor cannot determine
its relevance to the given input, so it is not included
in syntactic representations. We follow Hawkins (2001)
in hypothesizing that the situation changes with the
acquisition of the copula be, which the syntactic processor
can recognize as occupying I. The logic is that the copula
represents the most basic element associated with I, in
the sense that it is a free morpheme and an expletive
verb and has minimal selectional restrictions, and so
should be the clearest and therefore the first clue to
the presence of I. This expectation is supported by L2
findings (especially studies by Andersen and Stauble,
described by Hawkins) that other aspects of I (auxiliary
be, tense markers, agreement) develop after copula be.
Evidence that it does indeed trigger the inclusion of I in
representations is provided by the observation that as soon
as learners begin to use the copula they tend to place it to
the left of negation, typically avoiding such mistakes as
‘*He not is hungry’ (studies by Stauble and Shapira cited
by Hawkins). This observation suggests that the copula is
in the I position rather than the V position (see below for
related discussion), from approximately the time it first
appears.
Because the meaning of a copula is purely relational,
it can only be identified in context; in other words it must
be surrounded by content words that have already been
acquired. Suppose a learner has encountered the sentence
‘The glass is empty’. By assumption, the lexicon already
contains fully developed entries for each of the words
except be. The phonology module is therefore capable of
parsing the string into four words, with the third word
initially identified only as something new.
Thus, the new PS /Iz/ is established. The phonology-
syntax interface processor then writes a new item in
SS, coindexed with it, triggering the SS/CS interface
processor to write another new item in CS, also coindexed.
At the syntactic level, the SS pattern Art–N–?–A is
initially written, where ‘?’ represents the new item. The
syntax module then produces any syntactically acceptable
representations it can from this incomplete information.
At least one of these is likely to treat the new element
as I, because valid representations will result. This entire
process is guided by UG, as instantiated in the syntactic
processors.
The conceptual processor is likely to accept the
representation, because doing so should allow construc-
tion of an acceptable CS. I is the natural home for a
copula, so when the syntax places I in the representation
the conceptual processor can (perhaps must) give the
coindexed item in CS a meaning consistent with a
copula. The resulting representation as a whole should
be acceptable to the conceptual processor, so the SS
representation identifying ‘?’ as I is not rejected. I then
remains in SS as a (potentially) permanent item. Similarly,
the meaning given the corresponding CS item remains.
The syntactic and conceptual items will be coindexed with
one another and with the PS /Iz/.
There are no guarantees in this process. For any
given input, the syntax processor might not produce
a syntactically acceptable representation that treats the
new item as I; if it does the conceptual processor might
not accept this representation. Thus, initial establishment
of I might occur only after multiple encounters with
potentially useful input.
The strength feature
Once I exists in SS, its features can be established in future
parsing. Consider the [strong] vs. [weak] feature, which
determines whether verbs can appear in the I position
rather than in their canonical position in the VP.2 If it is set
at [strong] (the activation level of the latter is higher than
that of [weak]), when it becomes part of a representation
this setting will have the consequences shown in (2).
(2) *We finished quickly our meal.
Placement of the verb finished in the I position, to the
left of the adverb quickly, results in a sentence that is
ungrammatical in English (in contrast to French, for
example). Thus, English learners must end up with the
[weak] setting, which blocks this structure.
One type of input that could establish this feature value
(or further strengthen it) is the appearance of a negator,
not in the case of English, preceding a finite thematic
verb, as in ‘We did not finish our meal’. This situation is
inconsistent with a [strong] setting, so the representation
constructed by the syntactic processor must include the
[weak] value for I, or else an incoherent representation will
result. So the processor increases the current activation
level of [weak], with small lasting effects on its resting
level. A step has thus been taken toward firmly establishing
that value. Additional input will have the same effect,
further consolidating the appropriate setting.
One complication is that there may be an initial, default
value; learners assume that one particular value is correct
until they encounter evidence for the other. Platzack’s
(1996) argument that [weak] is the default translates in
our model into a claim that when I is first written on SS,
the resting level of [weak] is considerably higher than that
of its alternative. It is therefore used in production until
enough contrary input has been processed to raise the
[strong] value to a level at which it takes over.
2 In more familiar terms, it determines whether V can move to the I
position, one of the parameters of P&P; see Lasnik (1999).
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Pro-drop
The development of I’s features can also account for
the pro-drop parameter. P&P accounts of the parameter
hypothesize an empty category, pro, which can appear in
the subject position only if it is licensed. The licenser has
typically been associated with Inflection; we thus assume
that it is a feature of I, with the possible values [+] (directly
or indirectly licensing pro, permitting pro-drop) and [−]
(disallowing pro-drop).
In comprehension, when the syntactic processor
constructs a representation lacking an overt subject (the
phonology provides nothing that can be analyzed as
subject), it seeks to place pro in that position. This is
only possible if the I feature is [+], so it raises this
value’s current level, with lasting effects on its resting
level if the representation is not rejected. The [−] value is
temporarily raised when the syntax processor constructs
a representation containing an overt pronoun as subject;
traces of the change remain if this representation is not
rejected. In production, the processor favors the value with
the higher resting level, selecting pro or an overt pronoun
accordingly. The choice further strengthens that value.
English speakers reject null subject sentences because
the [−] value in English is very high and the [+] value very
low as a result of repeated long-term exposure to sentences
with pronoun subjects and very infrequent exposure to
subjectless sentences. This situation makes it virtually
impossible for the syntax processor to temporarily raise
the [+] value above the [−], a requirement for constructing
representations with null subjects. To use a handy
metaphor, it would be a very costly process, given the
great disparity in resting levels, so the processor avoids it.
The situation is reversed in pro-drop languages: [+] has
the higher level, so subjectless sentences are the norm.
Case and thematic roles
We assume Case and thematic roles are innately present
in the sense that they are embodied in the processors;
i.e., the syntactic processor by nature establishes items
representing Case on SS and the SS/CS interface by nature
establishes on CS conceptual items representing thematic
roles and coindexing them with the Case items.
Case
In P&P overt Case marking is an expression of underlying
abstract Case, which is always assigned to every NP
(see Chomsky, 1986). The particular Case (nominative,
accusative, etc.) is defined by the head that is in a position
to assign it to the NP in the representation. An NP
governed by I, for example, receives nominative Case.
We will assume that each abstract Case is instantiated
by an fc in SS. In constructing its representations, the
syntactic processor always connects each NP to one of
these Case items. When no suitable item yet exists (mainly
in the early stages of acquisition), it writes Casei onto an
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Figure 4. Acquisition by Processing at the SS/CS interface:
thematic roles.
empty node and temporarily connects it to the NP as part
of the construction of its representation. The new Case
is defined by the Case-marker that governs the NP it is
connected to in the representation being constructed; e.g.
nom when the governor is I and acc when it is V (see
Figure 4 below). This new fc, created specifically for the
purpose of building the current representation, will remain
(assuming the conceptual processor does not reject the
representation in which it appears), with an initially low
resting level, which should rise quickly through continued
use.
In this way the inventory of Case items in SS is
established relatively quickly, on the basis of innate
guidance from UG. The development of their phonetic
and conceptual counterparts is more complex. We will
not explore the relations between Case items and PS items
here, except to note that they can be quite complex and
variable, including null PSs, many-to-many mappings,
and interactions with other SS items, especially those
responsible for gender and number agreement.
Thematic roles
Whenever the syntactic processor writes a new Case
item on SS, the SS/CS interface processor writes
a corresponding item in CS, coindexed with it and
therefore co-activated with it during processing; otherwise
construction of a CS representation compatible with that
on SS will not be possible. Crucially, these CS items do not
represent thematic roles as such, but are probabilistically
associated with them. Thematic roles are features written
by the conceptual processor on them, each with its own
activation level, which is strengthened whenever it is used
in a representation. Figure 4 offers an illustration.
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When a learner encounters ‘Pat hit Chris’, the syntactic
processor is likely to assign nominative Case to the
first NP (based on government by I), leading the SS/CS
interface processor to activate the CS item coindexed with
nominative and connect it to the CS counterpart of ‘Pat’.
Establishment of an acceptable semantic representation
of this sentence will require the conceptual processor to
assign the agent role to this item (assuming that context
and/or background knowledge make it clear that Pat is
doing the hitting). Thus, it raises the current level of the
[agent] feature of this CS item (or writes the feature there
if it is not already present), with the long-term effect
of slightly raising its resting level. Through many such
processing events, the [agent] feature gradually comes to
dominate this CS item. Because the item is coindexed
with the nominative item in SS, a strong association is
thus formed between agency and nominative Case.
But this CS item is not exclusively associated with
the agent role. A sentence such as ‘Pat received a gift’
will require the conceptual processor to write the feature
[recipient] on it (see Figure 4). The two thematic roles
it bears will then each constitute a distinct feature of the
item, each with its own independent activation level.
Complications are introduced by passive constructions.
At CS, the essence of passive is a reversal of connections.
Returning to Figure 4, if the utterance is ‘Pat was hit
by Chris’, the conceptual processor must connect PAT
to the CS theta item that would otherwise be connected
to the item following HIT. The cue for this reversal
is the presence in the CS representation of an fc that
serves exactly this purpose. It is the CS counterpart of
the ‘passive’ item at SS (realized at PS as the verbal
forms associated with passive; be–V–en in English) and
is therefore coindexed with it. At SS its effect is to deny
Case to the NP in the object position and thereby force it to
appear in the subject position, where it can receive Case.
This category is innately present in the same sense that
other fc’s are, i.e. the syntactic processor by nature writes it
onto SS in the appropriate (pre-specified) conditions and
the SS/CS interface responds by writing its conceptual
counterpart in CS.
When a passive utterance is received before this item
is first written in SS and CS (i.e. before passive has been
acquired), the syntactic processor will begin to produce
a straightforward (active) representation for it, without
using a passive item, simply because it CAN quickly
and efficiently produce one that is reasonably successful,
without doing anything new. If extra-modular knowledge
is available, indicating that Pat is the hittee, the conceptual
processor will reject this analysis before it is completed,
cutting short this line of activity by the syntactic processor.
At the same time, the syntactic processor seeks to produce
other representations in parallel, possibly including some
that require the creation of new items or major changes in
existing ones (though such analyses are probably subject
to abrupt termination by the SS/CS interface when a more
conservative analysis proves acceptable to the conceptual
processor). One of these possibilities is to write the passive
item on SS, leading the SS/CS interface to write its CS
counterpart. If this option is pursued within whatever
time/space constraints may exist (during this parse or
on some future input), the conceptual processor will
not reject the resulting representation (because it leads
to a successful CS representation), so the passive item
will remain in SS, coindexed with the appropriate item
in CS (and PS). Afterward, it will be easier to get a
passive interpretation for future passive input because the
necessary items are already in SS and the processor will
not have to put them there.
Initially low activation levels limit this ease, but
they should rise with future input. Increases could also
come from production, which cannot establish new items
or features in SS but can strengthen existing ones.
Once the items/features are present and have coindexed
counterparts in CS, if the conceptual processor activates
the latter in production then the associated SS items will
also be activated and possibly have their resting levels
raised as a result.
APT and the competition model
This approach can incorporate some important
insights underlying the Competition Model (Bates and
MacWhinney, 1987; MacWhinney, 1987, 2001). The
focus of research within that model has been on how
the agent role is assigned to the appropriate NP, cross-
linguistically, using competition among a number of
cues, including semantics, word order, Case, agreement,
and passive morphology. Speakers must learn to weight
these cues on the basis of how useful each is within
their language. In English, for instance, word order is
dominant because it is a very reliable cue (the agent
is the NP preceding the verb, except when passive
morphology is present) and is consistently available. In
Italian, word order is more variable and therefore less
important; agreement takes center stage because it is the
best cue. Quite generally, the strategies speakers acquire
for assigning the agent role are products of the formal
characteristics of the individual languages, as in these
examples.
The APT approach hypothesizes no language-specific
processing strategies as such. Instead, cross-linguistic
contrasts are a product of acquired differences in the
content of the lexical stores, primarily the fc’s. We will
illustrate the approach by discussing the way that word
order and agreement influence assignment of the agent
role in English and Italian.
For this purpose, we adopt the possibly simplistic view
that the subject’s position in a sentence is determined by
direction of Case assignment. The fc I, which assigns
nominative Case, has a direction feature with the values
[left] and [right], each with its own activation level,
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influencing the direction in which I assigns Case and
therefore where the subject NP must be in order to
receive Case. In English the [left] value has an extremely
high level while the [right] value is virtually zero.
Thus, I must assign nominative to the NP to its left;
in other words, when the syntactic processor constructs
its representations, the ‘nominative’ fc is consistently
attached to the NP in this position.
When the SS/CS interface processor begins its work on
the CS representation, it connects the two corresponding
elements in CS, namely the cluster of thematic values
that is coindexed with the nominative item in SS and the
conceptual structure representing the NP to the left of I.
Because nominative has become strongly associated with
the agent role, through experience, the [agent] feature has
a far higher activation level than any other features in
the cluster and so the conceptual processor is pushed to
interpret the NP it is attached to as agent. In most cases,
this interpretation fits well with the verb’s theta grid. In
‘Pat hit Chris’, for example, the grid of hit contains an
agent slot, which is naturally filled by Pat because the
syntax processor ties it to the nominative item, which
is coindexed with the CS item in which [agent] is the
dominant feature.
A non-agent interpretation of the first NP would require
a temporary reversal of the activation levels in the thematic
cluster, raising another feature (say [recipient]) to a level
higher than that of [agent]. This would be a very costly
move, given the great disparity in resting levels, so the
processor would avoid making it unless forced to. What
would force it to is the presence of a verb with a theta grid
that does not include an agent. An example is receive,
which requires a recipient and not an agent. Thus, the
dominance of the [left] value of I and the acquired
association between nominative and agent virtually force
the conceptual processor to interpret the NP to the left of
the verb (to the left of I) as agent, exceptions occurring
when they are forced by the meaning of a particular verb.
In Italian, with its more flexible word order, this
enormous disparity between the levels of [left] and [right]
never develops. The nominative SS item can be attached
to an NP in either direction, depending on other factors,
especially agreement.
Following P&P accounts, we treat agreement as an
fc in SS. It is coindexed with its own thematic cluster
in CS. If the agreement is between subject and verb (as
opposed to object and verb), the [agent] feature will have
by far the highest activation level of the roles that make
up the CS cluster. Association of the agreement element
with a particular NP at SS therefore results in a similar
association of agent with the NP at CS, just as in the case of
nominative Case assignment. The conceptual processor is
thus pushed to assign the agent role to this NP. Italian
has rich overt subject agreement, which is used with
great consistency. The agreement fc therefore acquires
an extremely high resting level, as does its CS counterpart
and the latter’s dominant feature, [agent]. Thus, the NP
to which the agreement fc is attached is almost inevitably
interpreted as agent, unless (again) the verb’s theta grid
rules out this interpretation.
In English, agreement is not as strong a cue as word
order because it is not as consistently available and
therefore does not acquire the extreme resting activation
levels associated with the latter. Thus, when conflicts
occur between the two cues, word order dominates,
because the resting activation level of the [left] feature of I
is so high that it cannot be reversed even when agreement
clearly calls for such a reversal. In a nonsentence such
as ‘The men loves the woman’, the conceptual processor
must still assign the agent role to ‘the men’, because of its
position. The agreement feature must therefore be treated
as an error; i.e., the sentence receives an interpretation but
is judged unacceptable.
Bootstrapping
Bootstrapping (e.g. Pinker, 1984, 1987; Weissenborn
and Ho¨hle, 2001) is generally considered an essential
ingredient for language acquisition, so we will explore
its status within APT. In its most general form it refers
to the learner’s use of one type of linguistic information
for acquisition of another type. Within our model, this
means information at one level of the chain being used in
a way that produces lasting changes in the lexical store
at another level. This can in principle occur in either
direction, upward or downward. Interface processors,
mediating relations between levels, are at the heart of
this process. Crucially, APT requires that the information
be used entirely for processing purposes; the system is
not trying to make inferences about characteristics of the
language, only to produce representations of the current
input.
Upward bootstrapping is quite natural, due to the
assumption (see above) that new items and features
are established specifically in comprehension. Compre-
hension involves the interface taking rich information at
one level and using it to help build a representation at
the next level up. This process opens the door to the
substantial upward bootstrapping that apparently does
occur, as in the way prosody influences syntactic develop-
ment (see Morgan and Demuth, 1996; Weissenborn and
Ho¨hle, 2001). The most basic example is that when novel
words are written in PS, the PS/SS interface can then use
them to establish corresponding items in SS.
Downward bootstrapping should be more constrained,
based on informational encapsulation and the assumption
that new items and features are not written during
production. Ideally, in comprehension (where new items/
features are written) the effects of conceptual information
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on syntax (SS) are limited to rejection messages passing
from CS to SS. This restrictive notion of encapsulation
still allows important indirect conceptual-to-syntactic
bootstrapping.
In comprehension, the syntax overgenerates represent-
ations, producing all the syntactically acceptable ones it
can within existing constraints, the conceptual processor
issuing on-line rejections of those that do not lead to
acceptable CS representations. If a new item is necessary
for successful interpretation of the input and just one of
the syntactic representations contains it, the conceptual
processor is likely to reject all the alternatives, leaving
that one representation active and thereby allowing the
novel item it contains to become a permanent part of
SS.
The discussion of passive above provides an example.
The passive item is latently present, in that the UG-based
syntactic processor is prepared to write it on SS under
appropriate circumstances. But before passive has been
acquired, the syntactic processor cannot ‘know’, in any
sense, that English has a passive construction or that a
passive representation is appropriate for ‘Chris was hit
by Pat’. And there is no purely syntactic way for it to
find out. But if it does produce a passive representation
as one of its parallel attempts to analyze this input,
the conceptual processor can accept this representation
(by rejecting all the alternatives) and thereby ensure
that the passive item acquires a place in SS. Here the
combination of UG-guided syntactic overgeneration and
semantic selection allows the emergence of an SS item
that might never be realized otherwise, except through a
direct form of downward bootstrapping that would raise
serious questions about informational encapsulation.
The idea of indirect downward bootstrapping is
probably applicable to many additional bootstrapping
cases. The possible influence of semantic cues on the
determination of a word’s syntactic category (central
for Pinker, 1984; limited for Elliott and Wexler, 1986)
might be explained by the conceptual processor accepting
representations in which the syntax has given it a
semantically appropriate category and rejecting those in
which it has not. If learners are especially able and/or
especially inclined to analyze situations in terms of an
agent acting on a patient (the ‘Manipulative Activity
Scene’ of Slobin, 1985), the conceptual processor will
be more likely to accept syntactic representations that are
easily reconciled with this scene, allowing the beginnings
of a syntactic Case system in SS (though in a very different
way from that hypothesized by Slobin).
Some applications to issues in SLA
The model has implications for many issues in SLA. We
now consider four examples.
Noticing the gap
Acquisition necessarily involves a comparison, in some
form, between characteristics of input and current
characteristics of the mental grammar. This requirement
has appeared in many forms, including Schmidt and
Frota’s (1986) NOTICING THE GAP. It is usually stated in a
largely pre-theoretical form, with no attempt to specify
how the comparison is made. Our account provides
a theoretical context while abandoning the idea of a
direct comparison. When the success of the current parse
depends on the system having certain characteristics, the
processors impose those characteristics on it during the
parse and thereby push it toward a state that fits better
with the current input. There is no mechanism as such that
identifies contrasts between grammar and input. Instead,
the comparison is an abstraction from characteristics
of processing. A more subtle version of this sort is
perhaps inevitable, given Carroll’s (1999) observation that
acquisition is based not on inherent characteristics of the
signal but on characteristics of the representations the
processing system constructs from that signal.
The initial state
The initial state of the L2 has been the subject of debate
(see Herschensohn, 2000; Hawkins, 2001) as to whether it
consists of all relevant characteristics of the L1 (Schwartz
and Sprouse, 1996), its lexical characteristics but not
its fc’s (Vainikka and Young-Scholten, 1996a, b), or fc’s
with their values unspecified (Eubank, 1996). Within our
processing-oriented, quasi-minimalist approach, the issue
is the characteristics of the L2 lexicon and how processors
use them in constructing representations.
It is commonly assumed that the presence of L1
characteristics in L2 performance (production, compre-
hension, judgments) implies their presence in the L2
grammar, i.e. in the L2 lexicon. But this assumption
is open to question. The processing chain can access
both lexicons and clearly does so during L2 production,
as shown by code-switching. Furthermore, evidence
suggests that lexical access is non-selective (see Dijkstra,
de Bruijn, Schriefers and ten Brinke, 2000; Dijkstra and
van Heuven, 2002; but see Costa and Caramazza, 1999, for
some qualifications). When one lexical entry is accessed
there is a varying degree of activation for a host of
competing candidates in all available language systems.
So in any given instance, the appearance of L1
characteristics in L2 performance could in principle be
explained in either of two ways: (a) the L1 properties
have been transferred to the L2 lexicon; or (b) they are
coming directly from the L1 lexicon. Given the shared
processing chain and the pervasiveness of code-switching,
(b) is surely the proper explanation for some cases.
One might ask, then, whether ALL cases of apparent
transfer could be instances of (b). This idea suggests a
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radical alternative view of the L2 initial state: it contains
no L1 characteristics. This NO TRANSFER/FULL ACCESS
approach has considerable a priori appeal. Because the
processing chain clearly does access the L1 lexicon
during L2 production, in code-switching, an adequate
account of linguistic performance must explain how this
alternating access occurs. This appears, a priori, to be
the most natural place to look for the source of L1
characteristics in L2 performance. Such an approach is
appealing because it can potentially account for transfer
effects using independently motivated mechanisms.
Adoption of this approach would not resolve (or
dissolve) the disagreement over the initial state. It would,
rather, reformulate the debate. Instead of asking what
L1 characteristics are in the initial state of the L2, one
would want to know under what conditions the L1 lexicon
enters into the processing, production, and judgment of
L2 utterances, and in what ways. Given the apparent lack
of progress toward a resolution of the debate, such a
reformulation could have considerable value, especially
as it appeals to a research area not previously considered
in this context.
Transfer
The proper interpretation of apparent transfer effects was
a prominent issue in the preceding discussion. We now
consider this issue in more depth, returning to the example
of the strength feature of I.
White (1991) observed that French-speaking English
learners acted as if English I was strong, as it is in French,
producing ungrammatical sentences like (2), repeated
here as (3).
(3) *We finished quickly our meal.
In an attempt to remedy the problem, learners were given
explicit instruction in the correct order, resulting in short-
term improvements. Schwartz and Gubala-Ryzak (1992)
showed that the treatment did not change the parameter
value; learners’ performance continued to show a [strong]
setting for I. In a related study, Trahey and White (1993)
gave learners a flood of sentences exemplifying the correct
English order. They found that learners subsequently
accepted and produced more sentences with this order
but did not abandon ungrammatical sentences like (3),
indicating that once again the parameter setting had not
changed. Thus, the L1 I feature appears to have transferred
to the L2 and shown itself very resistant to change.
In our approach, these findings are explained in terms
of competition between the two I’s for inclusion in the
representations constructed in SS during processing. The
L1 I, IF, has an extremely high resting level, due to
constant use over a long period. It therefore has an
enormous advantage over its L2 counterpart, IE, and
routinely wins the competition, explaining the appearance
of sentences like (3).
The L2 I can enter when features of its L1 counterpart
cannot be reconciled with the rest of the representation.
When the input requires a weak I (e.g. when not occurs
before a finite verb), use of IF is virtually impossible
because its [strong] setting has such a high resting level.
In such cases IE, with its low resting level, can win the
competition and appear in the ultimate representation of
the input, because it has no competitor. Recurring cases
of this sort gradually raise the resting level of IE and its
[weak] value. This is, however, the only way the level
can be raised. In production, there are no such factors
forcing the use of IE, so the dominance of IF should persist,
perhaps indefinitely.
In this context, the findings of Trahey and White (1993)
are expected. Given the extreme resting level of IF, even
if IE could sometimes enter the representations during
the flood, it would have to do so a truly vast number of
times before its resting level could reach a point at which
it could seriously compete with IF. The flood – and the
explicit instruction – could influence performance only
through the development of extramodular metalinguistic
knowledge, with which learners could deliberately modify
their output. (See Sharwood Smith, in press, for discussion
of extramodular metalinguistic knowledge.) It could make
learners metalinguistically aware that English adverbs can
sometimes precede verbs but could not alter feature values
inside the module and therefore could not affect the use
of ungrammatical sentences like (3). In this context, the
fact that explicit instruction was somewhat more effective
than the implicit flood is also expected: explicit learning
of a relatively simple point should be more effective than
highly implicit learning when no guidance from UG is
available.
This discussion suggests, again, that the appearance
of L1 characteristics in L2 use, even when chronic and
long-term, need not indicate transfer, as it is normally
understood. The problem could well lie not in L2
competence but in the extent to which it can be expressed.
This is, in effect, chronic involuntary code-switching.
The limits of SLA
Second language learners rarely achieve the level of
success consistently reached by L1 learners. Many
possible explanations are available, some of which are
particularly interesting within our approach.
An input competition view
Problems for L2 acquisition could come from L1
involvement in L2 processing. During the parsing of an
L2 utterance, L1 entries are also activated and therefore
compete with the appropriate L2 entries for a place in
the representations being constructed. If an L2 entry
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loses the competition then any changes it underwent
during the current parse are lost; no learning occurs. If
L2 items routinely lose out to their L1 counterparts, then
L2 acquisition will be slow, or even non-existent.
An interesting corollary is that L1 items used in
processing an L2 utterance might undergo changes to fit
the input. The result could be small but lasting changes in
those items. One such experience would have only a tiny
effect, but repeated experiences could produce meaningful
changes, particularly in an L1 item with a low resting
level. So this discussion suggests that L2 characteristics
can influence the L1, though such effects should typically
be limited. Available evidence supports this prediction
(Kecskes and Papp, 2000; Cook, 2003).
Limits in working memory
Another possible source of problems for older learners is
a decline in working memory capacity. Working memory,
we said previously, consists of transient activation patterns
in the lexicon. In our model, a necessary condition
for long-term changes is sustained activation of the
appropriate items in the lexicon during processing. If the
capacity to sustain activation (working memory) declines
with age, language learning ability might decline with it.
The nature of working memory is a complex issue,
dictating caution in discussions of ‘decline’ in working
memory capacity. After all, children with limited working
memory capacity are efficient acquirers. Too much in-
formation in working memory at the same time may com-
plicate acquisition. A slower rate of processing may lead
to a reduction in efficiency of inhibitory mechanisms, or
vice versa (Salthouse and Meinz, 1995; Miyake and Shah,
1999). The issue is apparently not how much information
can be held in memory at one time but how long it can be
held there – the capacity to sustain activation.
An output competition view
The ‘no transfer/full access’ view of SLA sketched above
offers another possible explanation for the limits of L2
acquisition. The hypothesis it suggests, in its strongest
form, is that L2 acquisition has exactly the same success
as L1 acquisition, up to the limits imposed by available
input, but the resulting L2 competence cannot be fully
expressed due to competition from the L1 lexicon.
Production, like comprehension, involves competition
between the two lexicons for access to the processing
chain (see de Bot, 1992; Poulisse and Bongaerts, 1994;
Hermans, Bongaerts, de Bot, and Schreuder, 1998; Kroll
and Tokowicz, 2001). Given the strong connections L1
items have already formed with the chain (i.e. their high
resting levels), the L2 system inevitably faces an uphill
battle, frequently losing the competition and failing to
fully express L2 competence. The L2 lexicon may also
have to compete with L2 knowledge outside the language
module, which, given the general learning ability of the
typical L2 learner, may be highly developed and may have
attained strong access to output systems.
This discussion has implications for a current debate
in SLA, recently extended to language attrition (e.g.
Polinsky, 1997; Toribio, 2000; Sharwood Smith, 2001;
White, 2001). The frequent absence of overt inflections in
L2 performance suggests to some that the abstract features
they reflect are absent. To others, the fact that syntax is
behaving as though these features were present suggests
it is a matter of ‘spell-out’. Either the overt realizations
of the abstract features have not been learned yet or the
learner’s lexicon does make them available but something
happens in processing such that they fail to find their
target.
This something could be output competition. Items
from both languages are activated during parsing (see
above). If bilinguals have difficulty inhibiting irrelevant
candidates this must also stretch to parts of words, e.g.
inflectional affixes, possibly explaining problems in their
use. For a language attriter using L1, the resting level for
L1 items is lower than that associated with a perhaps less
developed L2, possibly leading to the L2 item winning out
against the targeted L1 item. And, in a Jackendoff-style
model, the lexical entries are triples kept in registration
while separate processing of each member is carried out.
Under such circumstances chunks written in the same
code but from different triples might interact or inhibit
each other in ways that result in an affix getting suppressed
en route.
In addition to attrition and the apparent limits of L2
acquisition, the output-competition approach has potential
as an account of some speech errors, transfer effects, and
code-switching. However, the idea is clearly speculative at
this point, awaiting more serious development. And it does
not rule out other views of the limits of L2 acquisition,
which might come, for example, from a combination of
output competition and transfer of L1 features to the L2
lexicon.
The model in perspective
We now step back from the details to look at the model in
the context of existing approaches to language processing
and acquisition (first and second) and then to consider its
possible limits.
The scope of the model
Our proposal is very ambitious. Its primary goal is
to explain language acquisition, first and second, in a
novel and theoretically appealing way. Because it roughly
equates acquisition with processing, it is necessarily
an account of processing as well, both production and
comprehension. In a very limited sense, it is also a
model of language, as we place competence within this
processing framework, but our ideas here are largely
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drawn from P&P. We have obviously not yet developed our
proposal to the same extent as models aimed specifically
at explaining one particular area (e.g. Crocker, 1996,
for comprehension; Levelt, 1989, for L1 production; de
Bot, 1992, for bilingual production; Pinker, 1984, or
Slobin, 1985, for L1 acquisition; Herschensohn, 2000,
or Hawkins, 2001, for L2 acquisition; Chomsky, 1995, for
L1 competence).
Relations to other approaches
A major inspiration for the model was Carroll’s (1999)
insight that input and acquisition should be seen in
the context of processing. We are in a sense exploring
the limits of this idea, considering the extent to which
processing and acquisition can be equated. Our approach
also resembles Carroll’s (1999, 2001) in its adoption
of Jackendoff’s (1987, 1997, 2002) architecture of
the language faculty. With this architecture comes the
assumption of modularity and rich innate structure,
largely as hypothesized by Jackendoff. It thus differs
fundamentally from approaches such as those of Slobin
(1985) or Bates, Bretherton, and Snyder (1988), which
replace innate linguistic knowledge with universal
mechanisms for acquiring the knowledge.
UG plays a central role in the model as a blueprint for
the language module, providing the overall architecture
and the details of the processors. Because the items in SS
and PS are written there by these processors, UG strongly
constrains these items, and to some extent those in CS,
as the latter are partially determined by the UG-based
SS/CS interface and SS items, especially in the case of
fc’s. Crucially for syntax, UG provides the pool of fc’s,
with their possible features and any default values. This
information is built into the processors, which therefore
write it in SS as soon as they determine that it is needed
for the representation of some particular input.
We diverge from Carroll and Jackendoff in using P&P
research, because it is a rich source of well-developed
accounts of syntactic phenomena and such accounts are
necessary for determining the details of SS and the
syntactic processors. Minimalism contributes the idea that
cross-linguistic variation in competence is restricted to
the lexicon, as is acquisition. This assumption establishes
clear connections to Herschensohn (2000), Hawkins
(2001), and Juffs (in press), among others. We differ
from previous P&P and minimalist models primarily in
adopting a processing-oriented approach. This move also
suggests interesting alternative perspectives on central
issues within these models, as seen above.
The combining of two different approaches – P&P with
Jackendoff’s functional architecture – raises questions
about compatibility. In most respects there is little cause
for concern, as we take Jackendoff’s general architecture
(which assumes little about the nature of syntax beyond
standard, widely shared generative assumptions) as the
framework and use P&P to fill in the details at the
syntactic level. The two differ most fundamentally in
the interface between syntax and conceptual structure.
Specifically, we follow Jackendoff in doing without
P&P’s distinct level of Logical Form (LF). He places
LF phenomena, scopal phenomena in particular, in the
SS/CS interface. Jackendoff (1997) argued in detail that
these phenomena cannot be adequately handled below
the conceptual level, with the implication that doing
away with LF as a distinct level actually allows better
explanations of LF phenomena. The use of P&P syntax
without the LF component does not appear problematic
either, as LF was already removed from syntax; the purely
syntactic processes operate independently of LF, their
output feeding into it. So dropping LF from P&P leaves the
syntax unchanged and has syntactic output feeding into
CS, which now includes all LF functions. Thus differences
regarding LF do not appear to pose any problems for our
mixing and matching approach.
We have in a sense gone beyond minimalism, applying
its idea that variation is purely lexical to language
processing strategies as well. Research inspired by the
Competition Model, described above, shows that speakers
of different languages process input differently (see
MacWhinney and Bates, 1989; MacWhinney, 2001;
and references cited there). According to conventional
thinking, this shows the presence of distinct processing
strategies – in our terms, that the processors are different.
But this need not be the case. The behavior of an
information-processing system is the product of the
characteristics of the processor and those of the database
it works with, in this case, the lexical stores. Differences
in the behavior of two systems can in principle be
attributed to differences in the processors, the databases,
or a combination of the two. One cannot assume that
the processors must differ from one another. We propose
instead to place the differences in the database, i.e.
the lexical stores. This move resonates with recent
findings that lexical storage may be far more extensive
than traditionally believed (Nooteboom, Weerman, and
Wijnen, 2002).
It also has conceptual advantages. MacWhinney and
Bates emphasized that the differing strategies result from
differing characteristics of the languages; speakers rely
on the cues that are most useful in their language. The
Competition Model posits two distinct types of entities,
formal characteristics and processing strategies that use
them; each must be acquired. A preferable position, a
priori, is that only the differing formal characteristics
of the languages must be acquired; the behavior of the
systems follows directly. This is a goal of APT. We cannot
claim to have fully achieved it here, but we believe we
have shown that the APT approach should be pursued as
a promising alternative to standard formulations.
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This discussion shows the potential benefits of merging
minimalist ideas with a processing-oriented approach
to acquisition. The most novel and important aspect of
our approach, though, is its abandonment of acquisition
mechanisms in the language module. Chomsky has
repeatedly suggested that the development of language
is not learning but rather growth, analogous to the
development of physical organs. There is considerable
tension between this analogy and the hypothesis of a LAD.
The latter, with its deductions and learning principles,
has dominated discussions of acquisition within the
generative perspective, but its activities do not resemble
the growth of an organ. APT offers a potential resolution
of this tension, doing away with the LAD and moving
acquisition much closer to the organic development idea.
The approach is primarily symbolic, using traditional
processors (UG-based) which implement principles of
grammar, using those principles to write and manipulate
symbols in information stores. These characteristics
give it several strengths: a route around poverty of the
stimulus problems, a direct account of the systematicity of
language, and the possibility of one-shot learning (a UG-
based processor writes a new symbol on an information
store).
It has clear affinities with connectionism, though,
especially in that development involves changes in
individual strengths resulting from success in processing
(cf. the interactive activation approach of McClelland and
Rumelhart, 1981). This characteristic gives it some of the
strengths of connectionist models. It directly predicts the
existence of frequency effects (e.g. Schwartz and Terrell,
1983; Gershkoff-Stowe, 2002) and the typically gradual,
non-discrete character of learning. It explains learners’
ability to recover from errors (e.g. Bowerman, 1988) –
one feature value might become stronger early on, based
on limited input, but subsequent input can raise another
value enough to reverse the system’s behavior. In this
way it can also explain how learning can succeed despite
the noisy data learners routinely encounter (Truscott
and Wexler, 1989; Valian, 1990), providing a means of
incorporating the concept of ROBUSTNESS (e.g. Lightfoot,
1991) in a primarily symbolic approach. Robustness
involves repeated activation of items, resulting in lasting
increases in their resting levels.
But again we do not hypothesize learning mechanisms
as such, even in the connectionist sense. When a
processor raises an item’s current activation level as part
of processing and the level is maintained through the
parse, that item will thereafter have a slightly higher
resting level than previously. This might be seen in terms
of connectionist-type learning mechanisms, selectively
rewarding components of the system that have proven
useful. But a preferable view, we would argue, is that this
process of change is inherent in the nature of activation
levels, perhaps comparable to the way a muscle grows
through exercise: one could say the muscle grew stronger
because a learning mechanism selectively rewarded it for
participating in the exercise, but such a description would
be at best unhelpful. In adopting this view we diverge from
all explicit theories we are familiar with.
Limits of APT?
The claim that development of the language module can be
explained this way is admittedly quite strong, especially
regarding several areas we have deliberately neglected,
mainly for reasons of space, including the phonology
processor and the PS/SS and SS/CS interfaces. Some
issues we have discussed require more in-depth treatment,
and additional issues must also be addressed, such as
the establishment of syntactic categories (see Culicover,
1999) and the possible role of distributional analysis.
Processing strategies do not appear to pose any problem
of principle, but caution is also required here.
Language acquisition also involves the considerable
linguistic knowledge found outside the module, which
might be acquired differently. This category includes
metalinguistic knowledge of all sorts plus orthography and
other aspects of reading/writing skills. Word meanings
occupy a marginal position in relation to the module, and
a full account of their development should reflect this
position. APT may have considerable relevance even here,
though, as seen in the discussion of content words above.
Conclusion
Faced with the frustrating fragmentation within this
multidisciplinary field, our goal in this paper has been
to present a reasonably detailed and explicit model of
bilingual language acquisition, incorporating plausible
accounts of the nature of language and language use.
Jackendoff’s processing-friendly proposals were adopted
rather than an approach in which linguistic competence
issues are explained purely in abstracto, although such
accounts are certainly not dismissed as irrelevant.
The main thrust has been to provide a common
framework within which one can productively study
many important, but normally disparate issues in the
field together. These issues include – in addition to
processing and acquisition – transfer, code-switching,
language attrition, the role of UG and its limits, and
the limits of SLA relative to L1 acquisition. Possible
approaches have been touched upon here and will be
explored in greater detail elsewhere.
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As an occasional visitor to the land of SLA, I found myself
somewhat mystified by the approach of Truscott and
Sharwood Smith (henceforth TSS). Unless I have totally
misunderstood them, they are arguing against the separate
existence of both a Language Acquisition Device (LAD)
and a Universal Grammar (UG). But who ever thought
they were two? Occasionally linguists may write about one
rather than the other, but I have always assumed them to be
the same thing appearing in different guises (like Christ
and the Holy Ghost in Christian theology). If you have
UG, why would you need LAD? Processing with the aid
of UG seems the only way to go – to the extent that UG is
available to SLA, an issue TSS does not directly address.
TSS has a particular variety of processing in mind, and
I am simply not familiar enough with competing models
to be able to evaluate that variety. However, I feel uneasy
with any approach that deals with issues in such abstract
terms and contains no more than three example sentences
(granted that this now seems de rigeur in Minimalist
circles). My disquiet is increased when even these few
examples are interpreted the way TSS interprets them.
TSS is far from being alone in underestimating the
role syntax plays in determining semantic content (source
of the widespread belief that a really good parser is –
perhaps permanently – beyond the reach of science). But
according to Hornstein (1999, p. 45) ‘semantic structure is
a by-product of grammatical operations driven by formal
concerns’, and I would endorse this strong statement as
an excellent research strategy if falsifiability is a prime
concern (if conventional beliefs turn out to be correct,
counter-examples should pop up everywhere).
Take the first example, ‘It was only apparent, not
real’, where TSS claims that ‘rejection of the wrong
candidate [“a parent”, DB] only occurs at a late stage’
(p. 6). This statement is made ex cathedra, with no
experimental evidence cited in support. In fact it seems
to me inherently unlikely. ‘It was . . .’ should immediately
cue the expectation of a non-human referent, since ‘it’
is neuter and the copula, if not immediately followed
by a locative or adjectival, can only introduce a noun-
phrase sharing the phi-features of the subject. There
remains the possibility of sentences like those of (1) where
‘parent’ is immediately followed by either a participle or
a complementizer:
(1) a. It was only a parent trying to locate her child.
b. It was only a parent that complained, not a teacher.
Sentences of either type would entail prior context –
say, a phone call for (1a), previous discussion of some
incident for (1b). Without this, and with comma intona-
tion, readings with ‘a parent’ would be strongly disfavored
and likely ruled out altogether, long before recourse to any
conceptual processor.
We are then told that the syntactic processor might ‘try
to construct a representation for “The horse is beautiful”
in which horse is an adverb, like really, and the subject N
is non-overt, along the lines of “(These creatures are ugly,
but) those [Ne] really are beautiful”’ (p. 7).
While determiners such as demonstratives or numbers
can license an empty category, unaccompanied articles
cannot. That this is not an idiosyncrasy of English is
shown by (2a), from Spanish, which roughly parallels
TSS’s sentence:
(2) a. Estos animales son feos, pero los otros/los
mios/*los son verdaderamente guapos
b. These creatures are ugly, but the others/mine/*the
really are beautiful
Similar examples could be adduced from many other
languages. Moreover, NP-deletion can only be licensed
by a closely-preceding overt version of that NP, absent in
the case of the ‘horse’ sentence. Since nouns are far more
frequent in speech than adverbs, the default interpretation
would in any case indicate a nominal; an adverbial reading
would require positive evidence of adverbial identity.
To further illustrate how the syntactic processor works,
take a sentence like (3), which actually appeared as
a headline in a Denver newspaper, and which on the
conventional view ought to boggle automatic translators,
parsers and the like:
(3) Spy charges dog inspectors.
Here, three of the four words are ones that could in
principle be either nouns or verbs. I assume that TSS’s
syntactic processor would provide at least six possible
readings. Mine gave me only two:
(4) a. A spy has made accusations against people who
inspect dogs (or, has charged such people a fee).
b. Charges that they are spies have been persistently
made against some inspectors.
(My pragmatic processor, primed by CNN, enabled me
to select the second.) I think how my syntactic processor
worked in this case was as follows.
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(a) In a sentence of four words where no putative verb takes
a sentential complement and there are no conjunctions or
participial forms, there can be only one verb.
(b) The verb cannot be the first word because the remain-
ing fragment, ‘charges dog inspectors’ is gibberish if all
three words are nouns and the first is plural. The latter fact,
taken in conjunction with the lexical items chosen here,
sharply reduces the chances that ‘charges’ could be being
used attributively, as ‘tariffs’ is in ‘tariffs debate closure’.
(c) Agreement is okay if the second word is a verb
(‘spy’ sing., ‘charges’ sing.) and if the third word is a
verb (‘charges’ pl., ‘dog’ pl.) yielding the two remaining
possibilities, (4a) and (4b), as possible readings.
In other words, even if Hornstein’s dictum proves
overly strong, the role of the syntactic processor in
sentence processing is hard to overestimate, and TSS,
like most work, errs in the opposite direction. For all
that, TSS’s version of a processing model may still beat
the competition. I wouldn’t know; I’m a stranger here
myself.
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Truscott and Sharwood Smith (henceforth T&SS) propose
a novel theory of language acquisition, ACQUISITION BY
PROCESSING THEORY (APT), designed to account for both
first and second language acquisition, monolingual and
bilingual speech perception and parsing, and speech
production. This is a tall order. Like any theoretically
ambitious enterprise, the APT shares certain properties
with much that has gone before. Like the Competition
Model (CM; MacWhinney, 1987, 1997; MacWhinney
and Bates, 1989, inter alia) and other associative network
connectionist learning models, the APT eschews a Lan-
guage Acquisition Device (LAD) by treating acquisition
as the strengthening of levels of representation activation.
A parser can produce multiple representations of a parse
string in parallel, which then ‘compete’ as analyses for
an input string. Unlike the CM, however, the APT is
not motivated by a solid program of empirical studies
in language acquisition or cross-language processing.
Nor does it strike me as theoretically coherent, for the
APT, unlike the CM, assumes that knowledge of language
involves knowledge of grammatical structure and that the
parser makes deterministic use of Universal Grammar in
the form of a Minimalist grammar. The determinism is
important here; the claim to eliminate LAD hinges on it.
Like the Autonomous Induction Theory (AIT; Carroll,
1999, 2001, 2002a, b), the APT embeds acquisition in the
tri-partite processing architecture of Jackendoff’s (1987,
1990, 1997, 2002). What is not apparent from the APT,
is that Jackendoff’s research is not designed to moti-
vate a particular theory of PARSING but, rather, to motivate
the Representational Modularity Theory of linguistic
competence, which explicitly rejects the syntactico-
centric views of grammar which Chomsky has espoused.
The empirical motivation for the tri-partite theory of
competence undermines Minimalism. The APT would
appear to require both PF and LF in order to explain
a number of grammatical phenomena; these additional
levels of syntactic representation are fundamentally
incompatible with the Jackendovian model of linguistic
competence.
The AIT, like the Modularity Matching Model (MMM;
Crain and Thornton, 1998; Crain and Wexler, 1999),
assumes that a LAD is responsible for creating the
structural differences in grammars which, in turn, cause
the well-documented behavioural differences in users of
different languages. The AIT assumes that the LAD is
severely constrained in numerous ways, but is essential
to explaining the equally well-documented differences
between child and adult grammars, or between L2
learners’ and monolingual native speakers’ grammars
of the target language. It postulates a LAD for the
simple reason that these differences do not reduce to
differences in the specification, and combination, of
lexical items. The APT cannot describe, let alone explain,
well-documented language-specific NON-LEXICAL parsing
preferences (Cuetos and Mitchell, 1988; Mitchell, Cuetos,
Corley and Brysbaert, 1995; Cuetos, Mitchell and Corley,
1996), which turn out to be relevant for the parsing of
L2 learners (Ferna´ndez, 2003). The APT cannot describe,
let alone explain, processing differences arising between
early and late L2 learners attributable to differences in the
way in which each group of learners encodes a universal
feature in the lexical entry of nouns (Guillemon and
Grosjean, 2001).
Along with the CM, the AIT, the MMM, and
emergentist approaches to syntax (O’Grady, 2002,
2003), the APT hypothesises that children and adults
share a common language-processing system. Like
emergentist models, the APT sees structural knowledge
emerging automatically through the operation of language
processors building representations, using information
from lexical items to do so. In the case of the APT,
it is Merge. Like the MMM, the APT assumes that
language acquirers have access to a universal, invariant
parser and that all learners have access to the constraints
and principles of UG at all stages of acquisition. Crain
and Thornton (1998) make use of the Principles and
Parameters setting version of generative syntax; the APT
adopts Minimalism. The MMM, however, hypothesises
that all of the linguistic abilities of the child are the same
as the adults (Crain and Thornton, 1998, p. 30), including
working memory and attention, and, therefore, that
differences in learners’ grammars cannot be influenced
by such things. Thus, whenever the behaviour of children
and adults differs on some task, the differences must
be due to their grammars – and hence to the LAD.
T&SS have no LAD; they do invoke some undocumented
limits in working memory in ‘older learners’ (p. 15).
One can only guess what population T&SS are referring
to, but empirical research dealing with the effects of
aging on working memory (Krampe, Engbert and Kliegl,
2001; Oberauer, Demmrich, Mayr and Kliegl, 2001;
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Oberauer and Kliegl, 2001) suggests that differences in
working memory are not going to support the differences
in children and adult grammars in second language
acquisition.
The APT does not arise from a response to specific em-
pirical issues in either first or second language acquisition.
The major goal appears to be a sweeping application of
Occam’s razor. But the savings are only apparent. Standard
parsers implement acquired grammatical distinctions.
T&SS introduce several representation-creating and
representation-changing operations into their parser: it
creates ‘empty’ SS and CS or PS items by coindexation,
writes features onto lexical representations, deletes
features from lexical representations (‘reversing’ prior
feature assignment), copies ‘chunks’ of representations.
None of these operations are deterministic, formally well-
defined, nor do they appear to be constrained.
Minimalism without empirical and descriptive ade-
quacy is hardly an advantage. Consider what T&SS give
up.
(i) By attempting to reduce parsing to the activation of
lexical items, they lose an account of cross-linguistic
parsing differences.
(ii) With Merge and activation as its procedures, the APT
cannot describe, let alone explain, the acquisition
of numerous language-specific constructions which
are not reducible to c- or s-selection properties of
lexical items, including Heavy-NP Shift, Left and
Right Dislocations, parenthicals, and many more
(Jackendoff, 2002, pp. 178–183).
(iii) By apparently confounding primitive linguistic
features with lexical items, and by failing to distin-
guish language parsing from language production,
T&SS cannot describe, let alone explain, how
bilingual learners create and use unique word classes,
particularly classes only indirectly related to the
speech they hear. Deuchar (1999), for example,
argues that her learner treats ma´s paper ‘more paper’
or oh-dear book ‘an unexpected event has affected
the book’ as a predicate (argument) structure, the
forms ma´s and oh-dear being acategorial, i.e., non-
lexical categories. Deuchar explicitly states that
expressions like ma´s paper are not part of the
adult input so we must conclude that the child’s
parser is never confronted with it. These utterances
arise not because of the way the child’s parser
parses ma´s paper but rather as a result of the
child’s combining bits of language in an entirely
creative way. The model appears to be motivated by
universal primitives available in the logical structure
of Conceptual Representations, namely functors
and arguments. Such creativity cannot be the sole
result of ‘lexical activation’ since that account fails
to explain how the category arises in the first
place. Note too that these word classes drop out
of the child’s grammar in their original predicate
functions, or disappear entirely. The predicate oh-
dear thus is reclassified into an interjection (with no
combinatorial properties). Since the form oh-dear
survives into the adult system, it must continue to be
activated. But the formative loses some conceptual
features and acquires others over the course of time
and loses all of its syntactic features. The APT cannot
capture such developmental patterns.
(iv) By failing to recognise the fundamental differences
between parsing and speech production, T&SS have
serious problems explaining where grammatical
competence ends and performance begins. The
sentence grammars of English and French both
require a characterisation of left dislocations
(Carroll, 1981; Lambrecht, 1981, 1994), but a theory
of speech production must explain how utterances
like the following arise:
(1) a. Moi-la`, c’est Poulet Dore´
Me-interjection it is Poulet Dore´ [the name
of a restaurant].
‘I prefer Poulet Dore´’ (Carroll, 1981)
On a duˆ se battre pour la
one PAST ought oneself fight for the
France aussi.
b.
France too
C¸a on a jamais refuse´, quoi mais
that one PAST never refused, what but
euh moi,
um me,
je tiens compte de la Bretagne
I hold account of the Brittany
‘we had to fight for France too, that we never
refused, you know, but me, I take Brittany
into consideration’ (cited in Beeching, 1999,
p. 82)
c. Well, that guy, you know, the one who’s hold-
ing up the bar, he comes here every night.
The APT is certainly innovative, but its innovation –
namely the elimination of the LAD and the apparent
reduction of processing to changes of activation levels –
is neither warranted by acquisition data nor appears to be
an improvement over other theories. In its current scope,
the APT looks like a theory of everything, and unlikely to
meet standard criteria of adequacy of a theory of language
acquisition.
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In their keynote contribution, Truscott and Sharwood
Smith offer a general model of language development
from a processing perspective. As they state, their model
is very ambitious: Their ‘acquisition by processing’
theory (APT) aims not only at explaining both first and
second language acquisition but also real-time processing
in language comprehension and production. APT takes
a cross-disciplinary approach that intends to bring
together research on linguistic structure and on general
cognition. However, the joint contribution of linguistic and
psycholinguistic approaches is mainly evident in terms of
theoretical concepts (e.g. UG, syntactic rules, modules,
activation) because the presented empirical evidence is
limited in scope.
The authors’ attempt at developing an interdisciplinary
approach is laudable because it may lead to a model that
benefits from insights and strengths of several disciplines.
However, such an approach may be vulnerable because of
limitations of each contributing approach and it may suffer
from incompatibilities between paradigmatic principles.
In the following sections, we will consider the extent
to which APT appears to profit from cross-disciplinary
integration while avoiding its drawbacks.
Before presenting our comments, we note that our
understanding of APT may be less than perfect because
the current paper tells a rather global and abstract tale
with relatively few concrete examples and applications.
In addition, unclarities sometimes arise because of loose
wording. We consider it to be of the utmost importance
that the terminology used in formulating a new theory
is as unambiguous and explicit as possible. However,
in the section ‘The place of an L2 in the language
module’, the authors state that ‘two knowledge bases
are competing for access to a single processing system’
(p. 4). We take this to mean that a presented input
leads to competition of some kind between information
originating from two knowledge bases. Knowledge bases,
being passive collections of representations, cannot
really compete themselves; only activated representations
can compete. Is there even independent evidence for
two separate knowledge bases? Clearly, one integrated
knowledge base cannot compete with itself. As a second
example, note that the authors maintain that in the example
‘They walk to work’ (one of the few they give in the
paper), there is ‘nothing in the phonological form of the
utterance [that] indicates its [INFL’s] presence’ (p. 5).
The subject pronoun, however, appears in the nominative
form, indicative of the presence of INFL, which assigns
nominative case when it is finite or, in minimalist terms,
checks nominative case.
Although imprecise wording may lead to misun-
derstandings, we are more concerned with problems
arising from tension between the paradigmatic principles
from linguistic or psycholinguistic approaches. At the
risk of oversimplifying, APT appears to be a linguistic
theory on which a psychological learning mechanism and
psycholinguistic processing notions have been grafted.
Most of our points of criticism follow from the tension
that arises from the specific way in which the different
approaches are combined, and omissions in the operation.
1. Separate knowledge representations and
processing mechanisms
In APT, a distinction is made between knowledge
representations and processing mechanisms, at least with
respect to lexical aspects of linguistic knowledge. Such a
distinction is indeed important from a psycholinguistic
point of view, and potentially allows an extension of
the authors’ account of second language learning to
performance by language user populations that exhibit
deviant language use. The spontaneous speech of
aphasics, for instance, shares a number of characteristics
with that of young children and second language learners,
and would therefore be a prime candidate for such a
treatment.
Indeed, there is evidence from aphasia that a strict
distinction should be made between the representation
of linguistic knowledge and the use of that knowledge
in language processing. Aphasics appear to retain the
grammatical knowledge of their language, but limited
working memory capacity and timing problems prevent a
normal use of this knowledge in language production and
comprehension (cf. Kolk, 1995; Sabourin and Haverkort,
2003). Evidence for a similar distinction has recently been
presented for second language learners (Sabourin, 2003).
However, it is unclear whether the APT account can be
applied to all other (e.g. non-lexical) types of linguistic
knowledge. It has been shown, for instance, that aphasics
still exhibit semantic priming effects at trace positions
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of moved elements, be it with a delay of about 600 ms,
due to a delay in processing (Burkhardt, Pin˜ango and
Wong, 2003). This indicates that they establish filler-
gap relations. Arguably, these relations are established
in the universal syntax processor of the model, so it would
have to be assumed that this component and the lexical
representations (which can be shown to be available
to aphasics by means of syntactic priming effects, cf.
Haarmann, 1992) can be available at the same time; in
that case, processing problems must be due to working
memory constraints.
2. The role of working memory constraints
Unfortunately, working memory is the least worked-out
aspect of the model. Its structure and precise role are
left pretty much implicit. This is regrettable, especially
because it is precisely this component that is so central
to explaining deviant language behavior in aphasics and,
arguably, first and second language learners (see below).
Working memory is also a key feature of the model to
account for the old competence–performance distinction.
One needs it to explain why longer and syntactically more
complex sentences cause more problems in production
and comprehension. It may also partly explain why
models of word recognition assume parallel activation
of different lexical candidates, while those of syntactic
parsing assume bottom-up and depth-first processing with
only few syntactic structures active in parallel (cf. garden
path sentences). As it is so central a notion from a number
of different perspectives, its structure and role need to be
made more explicit.
Here we illustrate just one aspect of its importance.
Working memory differences may underlie individual
differences in task execution. Indeed, in some cases
performance differences between monolinguals and
bilinguals may have nothing to do with differences in
syntactic knowledge but with differences in working
memory capacity. A pilot experiment conducted in
the NICI lab illustrates this point (Caelen, 1998).
When Dutch-German bilinguals processed German (L2)
sentences with temporarily ambiguous subject- and
object-relative clauses, they performed differently from
either Dutch or German participants in their L1, who
performed similarly. Both quantitative (latencies) and
qualitative (interactions between syntax and semantics)
differences in performance occurred. In contrast to
monolinguals, Dutch-German bilinguals processing their
L2 used semantic strategies to help them resolve syntactic
ambiguities. It appears that this difference in processing
strategies was a consequence of a relatively heavier
load on the bilinguals’ working memory during L2
sentence processing. In sum, task- and strategy-dependent
mechanisms for normal processing are needed and must
be specified.
Also from a DEVELOPMENTAL perspective, it is too
bad that the role of working memory is not made
more explicit and that the authors do not relate their
notion of working memory to the models available in
the literature (in this respect, it is telling that the seminal
work of Alan Baddeley is missing from the bibliography:
Baddeley, 1986, 2000; Gathercole and Baddeley, 1993).
In APT, aspects of development can either be explained
as lexical learning or as changes in working memory
capacity. This follows from UG no longer being a set of
universal principles, but being equated with the syntactic
processor, plus constraints on the structure and types of
lexical information. Assuming that the universal syntactic
processor is innate, language learning is then restricted to
learning lexical characteristics.
3. Activation in learning versus activation
in processing
Tension arises because the authors combine all-or-none
linguistic notions with respect to syntactic rules and
feature representations with continuous psycholinguistic
notions such as activation. With respect to the acquisition
of syntactic and other rules, the authors provide some
illustrations of their learning mechanism in the section
‘Acquisition by processing: Functional categories’. One
key mechanism is that repeated input may lead to a
(gradual?) formulation of rules, using innate knowledge
that is already available from UG in combination with
an activation mechanism. Although their account is
not specified in this respect, the authors appear to
suggest that, by application of UG, certain discovered
regularities ultimately lead to the instantiation of rules
with exceptions. However, the use of UG to make sure that
certain syntactic rules and not others are learned appears to
entail an important constraint on the learning mechanism
that is difficult to evaluate.
This issue reminds us of the morphological literature
with respect to the acquisition of the past tense of strong
verbs. The authors and Parallel Distributed Processing
(PDP) connectionists superficially appear to share the
theoretical view that there is only one learning mechanism
for rule-following and exceptional cases. The authors,
however, appear to hold that although there is only one
principle for learning, not all possible rules are treated
equally by UG. Thus, the question is: In what way is the
activation level of regular and irregular cases determined
by their token frequency (learning mechanism) and the
type frequency of the rules they follow (UG)? In the
model, activation strength does not appear to be just a
function of frequency of usage, as a learning mechanism
would seem to suggest (and as connectionists would
argue).
A similar tension arises with the introduction of the
[strong] and [weak] features that are all-or-none notions
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but can vary in activation level. In Chomsky’s Minimalist
Program (Chomsky, 1995), features are privative in nature:
they are either weak or strong, allowing checking to be
postponed until after spell-out, or forcing it to take place
before spell-out, respectively. However, in the present
theory, features also vary in activation level. In our view,
the privative weak/strong distinction is incompatible with
the notion of activation level that the authors introduce.
As we said above, the notion of activation level fits in
better with a connectionist/PDP type model than with a
rule-based model, which the authors are assuming.
4. Still other disciplines to be integrated?
In spite of APT’s cross-disciplinary approach, important
sources of evidence and theoretical notions appear to have
been neglected. For instance, there is considerable recent
evidence from the field of Cognitive Neuroscience, such as
ERP measurements, that may be informative with respect
to bilingual syntactic processing (Sabourin, 2003; for an
overview, see Kroll and Dussias, 2003).
Furthermore, at the end of the paper, the authors remark
that ‘this process of change is inherent in the nature
of activation levels . . . In adopting this view we diverge
from all explicit theories we are familiar with.’ (p. 17)
Nevertheless, the learning mechanism proposed by APT
has some striking commonalities with the principle of self-
organization in Dynamic Systems Theory (DST), found in
the work by, for instance, Edelman (Edelman, 1992; Reeke
and Edelman, 1984), and Thelen and Smith (1994). In
fact, we believe that important ideas about how this type of
learning mechanism may operate can be found in available
DST studies. For instance, in DST we find notions like
the emergence of self-organization in non-supervised
systems, context effects on category formation, and
the development of knowledge in action. However,
proponents of a DST approach would argue that the
learning mechanism proposed by Truscott and Sharwoord
Smith (using only context-specific adaptations) would
only be optimal if a simplistic notion of ‘innate ideas’ is
abandoned (cf. the work by Johnson and Newport, 1989;
Newport, 1990, on bilingual learning).
To conclude, we argue that the proposed theory does
not merely entail acquisition by processing, because of
the constraints imposed on the acquisition process by UG.
Furthermore, we propose that other constraining factors
should be considered, for instance, working memory
limitations and task-dependent strategies. These notions
are of the utmost importance because they bridge the gap
between competence and actual performance. Without
their specification and empirical evidence, APT is a
blueprint of a building for which the groundwork must
still be tested.
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Acquisition by Processing Theory (APT) is a unified
account of language processing and learning that
encompasses both L1 and L2 acquisition. Bold in aim
and broad in scope, the proposal offers parsimony and
comprehensiveness, both highly desirable in a theory of
language acquisition. However, the sweep of the proposal
is accompanied by an economy of description that makes
it difficult to evaluate the validity of key learning claims,
or even how literally they are to be interpreted. Two
in particular deserve comment; the first concerns the
learning mechanisms responsible for adding new L2
grammatical information, and the second the theoretical
and empirical status of the activation concept used in the
model.
Learning
The APT adopts the modular processing architecture
developed by Jackendoff (1997, 2002). Linguistic ability
resides in a set of encapsulated but highly interactive
(sub-) modules, e.g. the phonological store (PS), the
syntactic store (SS) and conceptual store (CS) as well as
interface processors (p. 2). Processing in both production
and comprehension is characterized as the interaction
of the processors that serves to modulate the activation
level of the representations involved, the resulting levels
determining what representations are used in processing
the message and in learning. Two types of learning are
posited. One is the strengthening of the resting activation
level of representations already present, making them
more available for future use. Frequency effects are the
most obvious manifestation of this kind of learning.
The other involves the learning of new L2 grammatical
knowledge and the restructuring of the L2 grammar
that results. Learning is said to occur when the various
processors cannot construct ‘an adequate representation’
of the current input and are thus forced to add a new
item (p. 6). What an item consists of is not specified,
though it includes such sub-lexical elements as functional
categories, e.g. inflection (I). Here the learner would need
to associate a form encountered in the input (e.g. the
copula be) with the syntactic representation. But as there
are no direct surface cues for I, the mapping between
the surface item and the underlying syntax must involve a
relatively abstract level of representation. This arises in the
APT as surface phonological and conceptual information
is extracted and the respective processors ‘coindex’ the
various mappings with the output of the SS to yield an
acceptable representation. How these mappings occur, and
how the various sub-processors and the system as a whole
assesses the adequacy of the resulting representations, is
not clear.
It is here that superficial, but misleading, similar-
ities can be drawn between the APT and the Com-
petition Model (CM; Bates and MacWhinney, 1989;
MacWhinney, 1997). Linguistic knowledge in the CM
is characterized as a highly complex but nonetheless
direct set of mappings between surface forms (cues)
and underlying functions in a specific language. The
CM explicitly rejects, a priori, an autonomous level of
syntactic representation (Bates and MacWhinney, 1989,
p. 39). The importance of the mappings is determined by
their distribution in the language, which in turn represents
the probability with which they will be learned. In the
paradigmatic Competition Model task the interaction
of various cue strengths (preverbal position, animacy,
contrastive stress, etc.) predict cross-linguistic judgments
of agency. Simple associative learning mechanisms
are responsible for developing these cue strengths,
which define language specific processing strategies
(Harrington, 1987). They ARE the formal characteristics
of the language in the CM framework and are not
independent elements that must be acquired separately
(p. 9). Like the APT, the CM assumes that learning is the
direct result of processing, unlike the latter, the specific
mechanism responsible for making that form–function
mapping is not identified in the APT. How does one
develop probabilistic cue strengths for innately specified
principles, as in the case of functional categories?
To be sure, the APT escapes the considerable induction
problem facing input-driven approaches by assuming
UG as a direct constraint on learning (Harrington and
Dennis, 2002). But the a priori assumption of a guiding
role in learning for these abstract linguistic principles
is at fundamental odds with the aims and the logic of
the CM approach. Furthermore, the formal theory APT
adopts to constrain this process, a mixture of Principles &
Parameters and Minimalism, makes no claims in regards
to either processing or learning: ‘The ordering of
operations [in grammatical theory] is abstract, expressing
postulated properties of the language faculty of the brain,
with no temporal interpretation implied.’ (Chomsky,
1995, p. 308). That no interpretation is implied doesn’t
mean none exists; however, it will be necessary for the
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APT to provide an account of how this abstract knowledge,
assumed to be directly embodied in the processor,
will constrain the extraction of knowledge from the input
in language performance. This remains the central issue
in second language acquisition (Carroll, 2001).
Activation
The concept of activation is central to the APT. The level
of activation of specific representations is the dependent
variable in learning in the account, but how literally we are
meant to take the notion is unclear. Activation can be used
as a descriptive label to characterize learning outcomes, as
in the raising or lowering of an item’s activation level
as a result of exposure (p. 5). The use of activation in
this sense has no explanatory value. On the other hand,
if a neurolinguistic interpretation is implied, then the
unity of L1 and L2 processes stipulated in the APT is
questionable. In a widely-cited study examining language
representation in the bilingual brain, Kim, Relkin, Lee
and Hirsch (1997) found evidence for distinctly different
areas of cortical activation in language use in early and late
bilinguals. Functional MRI data from sentence generation
tasks showed that L2 activation for adult bilinguals,
who learned the L2 post-critical period, occurred in an
anatomically separate area of the brain. As the task used
in the study would certainly have involved activation of
the kind of representations central to the APT account, the
separation is a problem. Although research in this area has
yielded conflicting findings (e.g. Illes, Francis, Desmond,
Gabrieli, Glover, Poldrack, Lee and Wagner, 1999), the
evidence that exists for the separation of the L1 and L2
argues against a unified model of language at the cortical
level.
The empirical evidence for the activation construct is
from the structural priming literature (Bock and Loebell,
1990, for an overview see Pickering and Branigan, 1999).
This research has demonstrated significant effects of
prior exposure to subsequent production of structures,
independent of lexical and semantic effects. Although
interesting, significant questions remain concerning the
occurrence and persistence of these effects, the nature
of the structural representations being activated, and
the mechanisms responsible for the priming. Priming in
experimental studies, while occurring significantly above
chance, is far from systematic. Pickering and Branigan
(1999) report priming in confederate–participant con-
versations to range for from 78% for the same-verb primes
(chance is 50%) and 63% for different verbs. Also, there
is mixed evidence as to how long such activations persist.
Branigan, Pickering and Cleland (1999) report very short-
lived activation, while most studies show the priming
effect to persist for some time (Chang, Dell, Bock and
Griffin, 2000; up to one week in the case of aphasic
patients in Saffran and Martin, 1997). As Chang et al.
(2000, p. 219) note, the persistence of priming over time
and intervening processing argues against a short-term
memory or temporary activation effect, and rather reflects
longer-term effects in memory.
A brief activation period is crucial for the APT account.
It is assumed that during processing the encapsulated
SS will automatically generate two (or more) possible
analyses for the input it receives from the other processors.
The unacceptable parses must be removed immediately
and the correct alternative returned as output activation.
This process is particularly important for the addition
of new items whose resting level must attain a certain
value to be used (pp. 5–6). To test this claim the authors
propose a hypothetical experiment. In the study a subject
would be primed with a sentence like ‘The floor was
uncovered wood’. Two candidate parses are available here
for subsequent priming. The correct one interprets ‘was’
as the main verb and the other interprets it as part of the
passive, prompted by the temporary ambiguity between
the verb and adjectival reading of ‘uncovered’. Both will
be momentarily activated, with the alternative passive
quickly rejected. The authors argue that evidence for
this crucial removal mechanism would be the absence
of subsequent priming by the rejected analysis. In other
words, prior exposure to ‘The floor was uncovered wood’
would not result in the subsequent production of passive
structures. Given the null-effects logic of the proposed
study and the fact that we have to accept the more
central (though quite defensible) assumption concerning
the activation of competing structures, one might question
how persuasive such findings would be as support for the
account and the theoretical framework on which it rests.
Which is just as well for the APT, given that robust
evidence for priming by the rejected parse already
exists. Bock and Loebell (1990) showed that sentences
containing an adjunct ‘by’ phrase (e.g. ‘The foreigner was
loitering by the traffic lights’) often primed the production
of the passive alternative (e.g. ‘The boy was stung by the
bee’).
These findings also underscore another problem with
the structural priming evidence, and this concerns the
nature of the knowledge representations being activated.
The Bock and Loebell (1990) results show that the
effect is structural, but that the structures activated
involve surface level configurations. Structures involving
argument phrase structures (‘by the bee’) can prime
adjunct phrase structures (‘by the traffic lights’). How
these surface effects reflect the working of the (innately-
specified) competence grammar needs to be specified.
Structural priming has been observed and studied
in the context of the language production system and
the various demands, linguistic and interactional, that
production places on the speaker. Although recent work
has sought to establish priming as the result of the nature
of language architecture shared by comprehension and
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production processes (Pickering, Branigan, Clelan and
Stewart, 2000), and possibly even implicated in implicit
learning (Chang et al., 2000), it remains to be seen whether
the effect is due to production processes per se or arises
as a more fundamental feature of the language processing
system.
A unified account of learning and processing
The authors lament what they see as the increasing
fragmentation in SLA research and theory that seems
to make a unified theory increasingly difficult, if not
impossible. This problem is not unique to SLA, as
specialization has made conceptual syntheses increasingly
difficult across all scientific disciplines (Wilson, 1998).
The APT is intended as a cross-disciplinary platform that
illuminates the key issues by bringing together various
strands of research relevant to SLA. This is a laudable
aim but one that appears unattainable in the near term,
given the complexity of the various domains – linguistic,
psycholinguistic, and cognitive – that must inform such a
model.
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This keynote article proposes a new model of language
development based on processing, the sole mechanism
of acquisition for the Acquisition by Processing Theory
(APT). The language module – adapted from Jackendoff’s
distinction between integration (building complex struc-
tures) and interface (facilitating information transfer at
the intersections of the sub-modules) – has phonological,
syntactic and conceptual processors that interact with
each other, working memory and lexical entries. On
the one hand, the application of Jackendoff’s model
to language learning bridges a gap between syntactic
theory and processing. On the other hand, its breadth
sometimes brings together strange bedfellows, as, for
example, minimalist syntax and APT’s ‘clear affinities
with connectionism’ (p. 17). In order to explore this
hybrid model within a focused area, I will limit my
comments to a discussion of features of I(nflection),
Case and thematic (theta) roles, highlighting the question
of how much syntactic theory APT needs. I will suggest
that the model could profit from a greater exploitation of
morphological input and its role in parameter setting.
APT uses a syntactic framework that draws on different
theoretical models. Although the authors appeal mainly to
Principles and Parameters (P&P), their accounts of verb
raising and Case assignment seem based on Chomsky’s
(1995) Minimalist Program, in which structural Case
checking is done in subject (nominative) and object
(accusative) agreement nodes through a Spec-Head
relationship, and movement is parametrically determined
by strength of functional features. For example, verb
raising is determined by a strong feature of French I,
whereas the weak value of English I entails no verb
raising. In contrast, in the P&P model Case is assigned
through government (accusative) or Spec-Head agreement
(nominative), and verb raising is determined by a positive
setting of the Opacity Parameter (Pollock, 1989). In more
recent work (Chomsky, 2000, 2001), Case checking may
be accomplished through long distance agreement as well
as overt movement; feature strength has been abandoned
and head movement is disallowed.
Truscott and Sharwood Smith (henceforth T&SS)
select pieces from the different models and then combine
these ideas with processing, as in this selection concerning
the verb raising parameter.
If it is set at [strong] (the activation level of the latter is higher
than that of [weak]), when it becomes part of a representation
this setting will have the consequences shown in (2).
(2) ∗We finished quickly our meal.
Placement of the verb finished in the I position, to the left of
the adverb quickly, results in a sentence that is ungrammatical
in English (in contrast to French, for example). Thus, English
learners must end up with the [weak] setting, which blocks this
structure. (p. 9)
Apparently, hypothesis testing leads learners to attempt
raised verbs in English only to discover that the resulting
sentences are ungrammatical, a discovery that must be
inferred from lack of contrary evidence, since input such
as (1) is non-existent. Given that input is the basis for
processing, one wonders how the learner could entertain
testing a hypothesis that is not provided in the input.
Furthermore, evidence from L1A and L2A questions the
hypothesis testing idea. L1 learners of English do not
raise inflected verbs above negation (Pierce, 1992), while
francophone L2 learners of English persist in raising verbs
even when provided rich input to the contrary (Trahey and
White, 1993).
In contrast to verb raising’s feature strength account,
T&SS propose that the null subject parameter is
determined by a [ + pro licensing] feature of I. They
are thus inconsistent in the theory they put forth to
explain parametric variation, and they do not provide
theoretical or empirical justification for this inconsistency.
An account that might lend more substantial evidence
to their analysis is the notion of morphological richness
as a determiner of parameter setting – generally the
surface morphology would provide overt interpretable
features (helpful as acquisition input) that license
the uninterpretable functional features responsible for
movement and agreement. In terms of L2A, they could
also profitably consider the role of L1 transfer (Schwartz
and Sprouse, 1996) and underspecification of features
(White, 2003). But finally, it is unclear if they really
need the theory to explain the acquisition by processing,
since generative models tend to be abstractions that don’t
relate to real-time processing, while associationist models
depend on input alone.
T&SS’s fairly abstract account of Case holds that Case
is instantiated by a functional category determined by
the Case assigning governor (I for nominative, V for
accusative). According to APT, language learners use
UG – which furnishes a template of functional categories,
features and (presumably) principles – to parse incoming
data and to extract morphosyntax and phonology. ‘In
constructing its representations, the syntactic processor
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always connects each NP to one of these Case items.
When no suitable item yet exists (mainly in the early
stages of acquisition), it writes Casei onto an empty
node and temporarily connects it to the NP’ (p. 10); the
new Case is reinforced through frequency, becoming part
of the syntactic repertory. The idea that new functional
categories can be generated whenever the learner
encounters an unknown item is highly unconstrained.
If UG already provides the template, then Case nodes
already exist and are simply called into play, a scenario
more constrained yet problematic in terms of proliferation
of functional categories and cross-linguistic variation.
Even if Case nodes only relate to structural Case, lang-
uages may differ slightly as to the number of distinctive
structural Cases in the inventory. It seems that a more
morphological account relying on feature specification
and agreement would handle both L1 and L2A more easily.
According to T&SS, thematic roles are conceptually
linked to Case through probabilistic association during
processing. ‘When a learner encounters “Pat hit Chris”,
the syntactic processor is likely to assign nominative
Case to the first NP (based on government by I),
leading the SS/CS interface processor to activate the
CS item coindexed with nominative and connect it
to the CS counterpart of “Pat”.’ (p. 11) This account
of Case assignment uses directionality rather than the
Case agreement nodes described above to explain the
processing of nominative. Moreover, it apparently treats
nominative as an interpretable feature, whereas usually
Case, as many other functional features, is considered
uninterpretable (Chomsky, 1995). It’s unclear how Case
could have a conceptual counterpart since it is strictly
syntactic and lacks conceptual content. The authors
suggest that the conceptual counterpart of nominative
case is the [agent] theta role derived through many
processing events, noting that nominative is associated
with agenthood 90% of the time (cf. Figure 4 on p. 10).
The authors do acknowledge that the nominative-
agenthood contingency is not absolute, as verbs like
receive and the passive construction with non-agentive
subjects show. So they then opt for a probabilistic
linking of abstract Case to the most likely theta role, an
analysis that might work in terms of processing, but is
irreconcilable with the idea of uninterpretable Case. The
distribution and nature of theta roles are two phenomena
that have been debated for years with a remarkable lack
of consensus (cf. Baker, 1988; Grimshaw, 1992; Hale
and Keyser, 1993; Herschensohn, 1996). Generative Case
theory explicitly rejects a necessary alignment of Case
and theta role, particularly in constructions involving
non-thematic argument positions (e.g. passive, raising) in
which instances of movement and Case are theoretically,
not probabilistically, motivated.
The discussion of the Competition Model (Mac
Whinney, 2001) following the section on Case and theta
roles, gives an illustration of how the APT learning
procedure works and sheds further light on Case and
theta roles. Speakers weigh cues in order to infer
morphosyntax, in English taking word order, but in Italian
taking agreement as the best cue. T&SS suggest that ‘in
English the [left] value has an extremely high level while
the [right] value is virtually zero. Thus, I must assign
nominative to the NP to its left’ (p. 12). Italian shows no
directionality, but uses agreement as the cue. Learners use
the probabilistic method for determining word order, Case
and theta role, linking, for example, nominative case with
agenthood. T&SS thus attribute syntactic learning to a
stochastic analysis of word order. Once again, they might
find a more appropriate account by considering richness
of morphology, since the English-Italian difference is
due – according to many accounts – to the rich inflection
in verbal person-number agreement in Italian as opposed
to English. Such an approach also takes inflectional
input into consideration as an additional (to word order)
clue to the learner. It is difficult to reconcile the
probabilistic learning (which could be handled by a con-
nectionist type account) with the abstract system of Case
linked to functional categories presented in the earlier
section.
Since both L1 and L2 acquisition are considered
equivalent by this model, the differential outcomes of
the two processes are not explained. T&SS claim that
the system of abstract Case is easily established since it is
inferred from UG categories, but they ‘will not explore the
relations between Case items and PS items here, except to
note that they can be quite complex and variable, including
null PSs, many-to-many mappings, and interactions with
other SS items, especially those responsible for gender and
number agreement’ (p. 10). Surface morphology is not,
however, a trivial question. Children learning L1 in the
Root Infinitive stage (Wexler, 1994) do not use inflection
and Case marking, but they pass this stage to acquire
full inflectional ability in a relatively short period. Adults
are notorious for lacking inflectional ability in L2, even
when they are expert learners (Lardiere, 1998; Pre´vost and
White, 2000; Franceschina, 2001; Herschensohn, 2001);
the diagnosis of morphological errors has been a topic of
intense discussion in L2 literature.
In conclusion, APT provides a model that forces a
consideration of both processing and UG. I submit that
the role of morphology is crucial to parametric variation
with respect to null subjects, verb raising and word order,
and that its integration into the APT model would lead to
a better account of how both input and learner production
contribute to acquisition through processing.
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Truscott and Sharwood Smith (henceforth T&SS) attempt
to show how second language acquisition can occur
without any learning. In their APT model, change depends
only on the tuning of innate principles through the normal
course of processing of L2. There are some features of
their model that I find attractive. Specifically, their ac-
ceptance of the concepts of competition and activation
strength brings them in line with standard processing
accounts like the Competition Model (Bates and
MacWhinney, 1982; MacWhinney, 1987, in press). At
the same time, their reliance on parameters as the core
constructs guiding learning leaves this model squarely
within the framework of Chomsky’s theory of Principles
and Parameters (P&P). As such, it stipulates that the
specific functional categories of Universal Grammar serve
as the fundamental guide to both first and second language
acquisition. Like other accounts in the P&P framework,
this model attempts to view second language acquisition
as involving no real learning beyond the deductive process
of parameter-setting based on the detection of certain
triggers. The specific innovation of the APT model is that
changes in activation strength during processing function
as the trigger to the setting of parameters. Unlike other
P&P models, APT does not set parameters in an absolute
fashion, allowing their activation weight to change by the
processing of new input over time. The use of the concept
of activation in APT is far more restricted than its use
in connectionist models that allow for Hebbian learning,
self-organizing features maps, or back-propagation.
Like other minimalist models, APT model assigns a
central role to a universal processor and attributes all
language variation to syntactic frames stored inside the
lexicon. Chomsky’s shift to minimalism brings his theory
in line with two consistent emphases in the Competition
Model – the centrality of the processor in learning and the
encoding of structure on lexical items. The idea that the
processor itself is universal was central to the first version
of the Competition Model (Bates and MacWhinney,
1982). Since 1978, I have also argued that learning of
L1 syntactic classes begins on the level of the individual
item and that higher-level syntactic patterns emerge from
the gradual formation of lexical groups. Although transfer
effects complicate matters in the case of L2 acquisition,
the Competition Model continues to develop based on
the principles of lexicalist, bottom-up learning organized
about a universal processor.
T&SS seem to be picking up on some of these earlier
Competition Model accounts in their brief descriptions of
parameter-setting within the processor. For example, they
talk about identifying the word ‘horse’ inside the utterance
‘The horse is beautiful’ (p. 7). As I have argued in perhaps
a dozen articles, this type of learning occurs under the
pressure of the processing of item-based constructions that
open up positional expectations for particular meaningful
elements. In this particular example, the relevant frame
is the item-based construction based on the word the that
opens up a following slot for a common noun. The definite
article does not have a clear expectation for a count noun
as opposed to a mass noun, but it will not tolerate a proper
noun, adverb, or verb. Thus, it provides a highly valid cue
to the extraction of the meaning of the following word.
Given this apparent agreement on the facts of learning,
it was with some surprise that I read the claim from
T&SS that ‘the Competition Model posits two distinct
types of entities, formal characteristics and processing
strategies that use them; each must be acquired’ (p. 16).
This interpretation seems to reflect a misunderstanding
of the Competition Model. In our model, all learning
is situated within the lexical frames of individual items.
Although Competition Model experiments lump together
groups of verbs for the purposes of experimental control
and generalizability, the theory has always assumed,
and specific studies have consistently demonstrated,
that the locus of learning is in the valency frames of
individual predicates. The Competition Model assumes
that the processor is universal and unlearned. This idea
is taken to be a new concept in minimalism, but it
has been fundamental to the Competition Model since
1982.
Despite our agreement on the central role of a universal
processor, the ATP model differs radically from the
Competition Model in its view of what is learned. For ATP,
there is a small set of universal functional categories that
are innately available to the processor. During processing,
those features that are used by a language are activated
to a certain level and that is all that is necessary to
account for language acquisition. The Competition Model
also assumes that acquisition occurs during processing.
However, unlike ATP and P&P, it assumes that each
predicate has its own unique semantic configuration of
roles. For example, the verb give has three arguments that
include a giver, a recipient, and an object transferred. The
verb chop has two arguments that include a chopper and an
object chopped. We insist on this low-level representation
of syntactic arguments because of evidence regarding the
item-based nature of early predicate learning, particularly
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verb learning, as well as the impossibility of establishing
a universal typology of semantically grounded cases.
However, we also recognize that young children and
beginning second language learners are soon able to
generalize across verb frames to extract language-specific
higher-order syntactic categories such as subject or
instrument. When learners come to form these higher-
order categories, they rely on the concepts of perspective
and embodiment. The categories organized by perspective
emerge not from an autonomous linguistic module, but
from general properties of human cognition.
Two decades of work in the P&P framework have failed
to yield a uniform universal account of first language
acquisition based on parameter-setting. On the other
hand, bottom-up, statistical learning accounts, such as
the Competition Model, have made continual progress in
extending our understanding of the details of L1 learning.
However, it might be the case that ATP would still be of
some value as an account of second language acquisition.
In this area, T&SS rely primarily on data from studies
of adverb placement by French learners of English as a
second language. The evidence here is that even advanced
learners have problems learning to place the adverb before
the verb. But, if learners are hearing examples of English
constructions with adverbs before the verb, should not
this input lead to a retuning of the weight of the feature
that determines preverbal placement? Apparently, T&SS
hope to solve this problem by suggesting that the errors are
due not to faulty L2 learning, but to code-switching from
L1. Presumably, they would argue that each French adverb
and verb has a frame that was set to an activation level that
placed it in preverbal position. When the French speaker
comes to producing English, these French lexical frames
become activated, despite the fact that the actual words
being produced are in English. If ATP is making this claim,
then I would say that what T&SS call code-switching is
nothing more than a terminological equivalent to what
the Competition Model calls lexically-based transfer.
But if parameters are in turn lexically based, don’t we
have a fundamental logical problem? If minimalism links
functional categories to specific lexical items, it vitiates
its own claim for their innateness and universality.
It should be possible to examine the exact nature of
lexically-based transfer empirically. To begin, we should
note that English itself seems to belie the descriptive utility
of the single parameter account when it permits sentences
such as ‘I like to eat sometimes Indian and sometimes
Chinese’, ‘Jim likes always something different in his
cereal’ or ‘You go how often to the store?’ If English (or
any other language for that matter) were strictly governed
by parameters, we would never see the complexity and
variation that we really have in syntax. In order to produce
the complete set of predictions for lexical transfer effects
in adverb placement, one would also have to examine
possible cracks in the French system to see where they
match up or fail to match up with English. Constructing
such a complete contrastive analysis is beyond my ability
in French and far beyond the scope of this commentary,
but it would be the best way to explore the ATP model
empirically. My guess is that, once the contrastive analysis
is produced and the relevant studies are run, the results will
demonstrate that learners are quick to pick up consistent
L2 cues, and that it is inconsistency in L2 that opens up
the door for transfer from L1. I hope that T&SS continue
to develop their ideas in ways that would eventually lead
to such empirical tests.
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Truscott and Sharwood-Smith’s (henceforth T&SS’s)
paper offers an interesting set of hypotheses about one
possible processing perspective in research on language
acquisition. What is striking about this exposition of
their model is that it ignores almost entirely the context
of previous research on this issue. Embedding their
exposition in its historical context would have in no
way diminished the innovation entailed in their proposal.
Instead it could have served as an instrument for ensuring
conceptual parsimony, which in my view is flawed in this
exposition.
Language processing has been a key aspect of SLA
(and L1) research right from the beginning. For many
of us this is marked by Corder’s (1967) paper, which
included, among other things, a discussion of input
processing that was taken up by other scholars. Other
lines of research included work on procedural skills
(e.g. Levelt, 1978; McLaughlin, Rossman and McLeod,
1983; McLaughlin, 1987), work on operating principles
(Andersen, 1984; Slobin, 1973), work on processing
strategies (e.g. Clahsen, 1984) and my own work on
processability theory (Pienemann, 1998a, b, 2003). A
brief overview is available in Pienemann (2003). Further
relevant approaches are described in the 2002 Special
Issue of Second Language Research.
In all of these lines of research, language processing
served as an explanatory construct for a number of issues
in second (and partly in first) language acquisition. These
included the origin of linguistic knowledge (e.g. Bates and
MacWhinney, 1981; Andersen, 1984), L2 developmental
trajectories (e.g. Pienemann, 1998a, b) and inferential
mechanisms (e.g. Carroll, 1999, 2001). Depending on
their orientation in the philosophy of science, these
authors developed their approaches either as modular or as
general-cognitive explanatory constructs. A great deal of
the debate surrounding these approaches has been directed
at two key issues: (1) procedural explicitness and (2)
representation of linguistic knowledge. It may be useful to
sketch out some of this discussion in order to demonstrate
its repercussions for the approach presented in T&SS’s
paper.
One line of research that offers a processing perspective
on L2 development focuses on L2 procedural skills.
McLaughlin assumes that ‘[t]o learn a second language is
to learn a skill’ (McLaughlin, 1987, p. 133) and that L2
learning ‘requires the automatisation of component sub-
skills’ (ibid.). Similarly, other authors have also expressed
the view that language acquisition entails the acquisition
of procedural skills (e.g. Levelt, 1978; Hulstijn, 1990;
Schmidt, 1992).
One early approach to SLA that incorporates a
processing perspective is Krashen’s (1985) ‘monitor
model’, which received ample attention in the 1980s
and has been subjected to extensive critiques (e.g.
McLaughlin, 1978; Gregg, 1984; Long, 1985). In his
‘input hypothesis’ Krashen claims that language is
acquired by learners receiving ‘comprehensible input’.
The ‘input hypothesis’ is aimed at explaining two things,
namely (1) the inferential mechanisms that drive the
acquisition process and (2) the assumed universal order
of acquisition. Critics point out that the ‘input hypothesis’
cannot be operationalised for any of its components.
As a result, it cannot be tested empirically. In other
words, Krashen’s model evades the issue of specifying
the architecture of the L2 processor and the inferential
mechanisms involved.
Van Patten’s (1996) work is an example of later
mainstream research on input processing. It follows the
main idea of the ‘input hypothesis’ and stipulates two sets
of input processing strategies in an attempt to spell out
aspects of the architecture of the L2 processor that regulate
attention and the assignment of semantic roles. Van Patten
follows Corder (1967) in distinguishing between ‘input’
and ‘intake’ and stipulates attention as the necessary
condition for input to be transformed into intake. This
approach is limited to one domain of language processing
and is unable to generate the data it is designed to
explain.
Carroll (1999, 2001) reviews the literature on L2 input
processing and concludes that the standard assumption,
based on Corder’s (1967) input–intake distinction,
according to which ‘perception is regulated only by
attention, which in turn is regulated by intention’ (Carroll,
1999, p. 343), is not supported by any explicit theory
of attention. Carroll proposes the Autonomous Induction
Theory, which is an explicit theoretical framework for
the induction of linguistic representation from linguistic
input. Her position is compatible with a modular view
of processing and a UG-position on cognition, and is
thus juxtaposed to the functionalist orientation of the
standard view on the attention filter in processing. This
work highlights the enormity of the task of specifying the
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inferential mechanisms that explain how input becomes
intake.
Processability Theory (PT; Pienemann, 1998a, b) is a
modular processing approach that is based on Levelt’s
(1989) approach to language production. Within this
framework the architecture of the language processor is
modelled as a hierarchy of processability that is applied
to developing linguistic systems. The logic underlying
PT is the following: at any stage of development, the
learner can produce only those L2 linguistic forms which
the current state of the language processor can handle.
The processability hierarchy is operationalised through
an implementation in Lexical-Functional Grammar. This
implementation of the processability hierarchy into an
LFG-based description of a given language affords
us a formal and testable prediction of developmental
trajectories in L1 and L2 learners. In this way PT
achieves procedural explicitness, and it adds a processing
dimension to learnability, which is traditionally defined
as a purely logical-mathematical problem (e.g. Berwick
and Weinberg, 1984). In sum, PT is procedurally
explicit, cross-linguistically valid, supported by extensive
empirical studies, and it is compatible with an LFG
account of linguistic knowledge.
The ‘competition model’ (Bates and MacWhinney,
1981, 1982) is a further approach to language acquisition
that offers a processing perspective. It is a functionalist
approach that is based on the assumption that linguistic
behaviour is constrained, among other things, by general
cognition (and not by a language-specific cognitive
module) and communicative needs. Following the
functionalist tradition, Bates and MacWhinney assume
that ‘the surface conventions of natural languages are
created, governed, constrained, acquired, and used in
the service of communicative functions’ (Bates and
MacWhinney, 1981, p. 192). According to this model,
it is the task of the language learner to discover the
specific relationship between linguistic forms of a given
language and their communicative functions. In the
competition model, the process of learning linguistic
forms is driven by the frequency and complexity of
form-function relationships in the input. In this context,
the majority of L2 learning problems is modelled in
connectionist terms.
The connectionist framework utilised in the
competition model has been subjected to severe criticism,
as evident in Pinker and Prince (1987), who analysed
the developmental assumptions of connectionist models
and falsified them manifold in empirical studies.
Whereas connectionists assume that linguistic rules
are ‘merely convenient approximate fictions’ (Pinker
and Prince, 1987, p. 1), these authors conclude that
‘connectionists’ claims about the dispensability of rules
in explanations of the psychology of language must be
rejected, and that, on the contrary, the linguistic and
developmental facts provide good evidence for such rules’
(ibid.).
In this context the reader is surprised to find that
in T&SS’s paper key features of the connectionist
architecture are grafted onto an account of linguistic
knowledge that is based on Principles and Parameters and
minimalism. In the view of Pinker and Prince, symbolist
and connectionist accounts of language acquisition are in
principle irreconcilable. If one does not share this view
(cf. Hulstijn, 2002, for a unified position) one would
expect a detailed justification of the grafting proposal
at an epistemological and a technical-descriptive level.
At this stage it is difficult to see the exact detail of
such a justification, because the nature of the graft
remains unclear. This is mainly due to the fact that
T&SS do not specify the assumed parsing algorithm
in an operationalisable manner (apart from providing
illustrative examples). This makes it difficult to evaluate
how the output of the processor can be translated into
the categories found in the assumed system of linguistic
representation.
This lack of procedural explicitness also makes it
difficult to test the proposal beyond the examples given
or to apply it cross-linguistically. What is described of
the architecture of the grammatical encoder is mainly
based on assumptions and no empirical data are offered
in support of the proposed model of language processing.
These last two paragraphs may at first glance be asking a
lot of a new theory of language acquisition. However, we
cannot compromise on the core requirements of any such
theory:
- procedural explicitness,
- theoretical parsimony,
- cross-linguistic validity and
- empirical soundness.
Certainly, many approaches to language acquisition do
not satisfy all of the above requirements, and there are
some recent ones that do explicitly attempt to overcome
this shortcoming (including Carroll, 2001). In my view,
this shows that constructing a theory of (first and second)
language acquisition (and processing) is a tall order
indeed. T&SS’s paper certainly provides an interesting
point of departure for such an undertaking.
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This essay by Truscott and Sharwood-Smith is a valiant
attempt with a laudable goal. It seeks to show how different
perspectives and disciplines can capture what is happening
in acquisition and notably in L2 acquisition. Nonetheless,
I think that the results are much closer to an elaborated
grammatical theory than an elaborated processing theory
(thus it seems less important to me than to the authors to
choose one label over the other). Their essential, sensible
idea is that where different grammars provide independent
analyses of constructions, both are computed (even where
the lexical items belong to only one grammar). Therefore
conflict is experienced which produces computational
demands. However this is pure grammar – just a more
sophisticated situation where, as I like to argue, the L2
person has Multiple Grammars (Roeper, 1999), creating
more computational work as well. In this respect, the
situation is no different from L1 acquisition, where the
course of acquisition involves generation and maintenance
of multiple grammars, some of which are shed and some
retained in the Final State.
The first half of the essay demonstrates enormous
erudition and efforts to synthesize, but noticeably does not
result in many specific analyses of sentences. It remains
at the abstract level. This is a natural prolegomena, but
not a deductive system, which is perhaps too much to ask.
Nevertheless, it does not seem that we see the promised
interaction at work beyond what can be captured by the
following simpler system.
Let us suppose that the parsing system outside of
grammar consists only of Merge. One element must merge
with another, either new or already analyzed. Two ques-
tions arise: which dominates which, and what level
does Merge engage if one object is complex? These are
reminiscent of how MINIMAL ATTACHMENT and LATE
CLOSURE decide where to attach (Frazier, 1978). Now
we can (possibly) exercise a default assumption: merge
high or merge low without engaging language-specific
grammatical assumptions. However, as soon as we begin
to decide the dominance question, we enter gram-
matical territory: what categories dominate the mergeable
element? The set of available categories will be suf-
ficiently detailed that they vary from grammar to grammar.
Modals function like main verbs in German and can be
recursive. One must know from a grammar when a modal
arises AND know if the grammar gives them a feature that
allows recursion. Therefore the grammar is now steering a
very elementary parser. And it is important to note that the
properties of the parser constrain the set of UG grammars,
so one might want to say that the parser also steers the
grammar. An example may help.
Suppose one is acquiring a second grammar (English),
but the first is assumed to be in the background (German).
Then we will assume that both grammars provide an ana-
lysis wherever possible. If one heard a sentence like (1),
(1) We should can must and then see if we were able to
sell it.
the English speaker will be able to recognize, perhaps
slowly, that in a certain context it makes sense: Hollywood
has a hard time creating old musty houses. If we could
can must and sell it, we would have a big business. In
German, one can have several modals, including can
must (er kann singen mu¨ssen), and therefore the German
speaker would have the extra task of coping with the
notion that there are two modals (which does occur in
English dialects I might could do that). We therefore
predict that disambiguation for the German speaker would
be significantly harder. There is nothing more involved
than saying that the speaker entertains two grammars,
maintains those analyses until they are resolved and that
such efforts require computational space.
Such effects are sufficiently strong and overt that
they are conscious. Presumably much the same happens
unconsciously and the theory of Carroll (2001) and
Truscott and Sharwood-Smith is aimed in that direction
and has inspired these ruminations.
Consider the following sentence in Spanish:
Every(2) student thinks he knows
cada uno de los estudiantes piensa que sabe
how he thinks he can best tie
como cree que puede atar
his own shoes.
sus zapatos mejor
We know that the empty categories in Spanish
alternate with filled pronouns. The empty categories are
preferentially bound to every student, while the full ones
are preferentially linked to independent reference. The
English speaker comes with a grammar where the full
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pronouns have both readings, and no empty subjects exist.
Therefore, for the version with full NPs, the English
speaker has his priorities the opposite of the Spanish
speaker when a quantifier is present. This should produce
a slight effect.
Much more complicated situations arise. One can allow
external reference for the empty NP in Spanish as well,
and it may continue down a sequence of empty phrases,
such as the sentence we just gave. However, it should be
very difficult for the English speaker to allow this reading,
since it would be naturally captured in English by full
pronouns no matter what.
In Spanish the empty pronouns cannot switch back
and forth between distributive and referential. That is,
one cannot say:
(3) Here is the teacher. Every student thinks will
expect that does homework.
where the first gap is ‘the teacher’ and the second is bound
to ‘the student’. In English, however, it is possible to
switch, but in a limited way:
(4) Every student thinks he will assign so much
homework that he cannot do it.
This can have a reading where the first he refers to the
teacher and the second he refers back to the student
again. Now here is where, if both grammars are engaged
for a Spanish speaker, we would predict quite a bit of
interference over the long-distance of this sentence. That
is, it should be harder for the Spanish speaker to have
shifting full pronouns in English, because the Spanish
speaker tries to analyze it as if it were non-shifting empty
pronouns (thanks to Luis Alonso-Ovalle for judgments
and advice).
These examples support the spirit of the Truscott-and-
Sharwood Smith enterprise but the method seems a bit
different. The notion that access to Multiple Grammars
is needed immediately suggests that new processing
demands should will arise, which should lead directly to
predictions for numerous challenging examples like those
we have just discussed. Truscott and Sharwood Smith’s
work serves as an inspiration to study such L2 effects
carefully.
One final question: does the syntax/semantics interface
show the same interactions? We could show, of course,
that lexical ambiguity will cause interference. Can we also
show that more sophisticated interface effects are present
(like grammatically varied representations of aspect)? It
seems, perhaps too pessimistically, that when the larger
realm of human cognition is engaged – where much of
our thinking is rather slow (humans ruminate on things
for weeks as well as milliseconds) – that we do not yet
know how to isolate what functions in the rapid mental
computations around language. In other words, basic
insights into restricting the interface are still missing.
Nevertheless, all attempts – like those of Truscott and
Sharwood Smith’s – to achieve a synthesis across domains
help us to enliven the questions.
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To begin with, we thank the commentators for their
remarks, which both intrigued and challenged us in
various ways. Time and space limits prevent us from doing
justice to all the points they raised, so we will focus on
those we consider most significant and are best prepared
to deal with. One of these points, of course, is the overall
character and status of our proposal. Pienemann terms
Acquisition by Processing (APT) ‘an interesting point of
departure’ (p. 38) for the development of a theory of
acquisition and processing. Harrington and Carroll say
in effect that it can’t be done; others seem more open to
the possibility. In any case, we quickly accept Roeper’s
suggestion that what we have presented is more a ‘prole-
gomena’ (p. 21) to a theory than a full-fledged theory in
itself.
We think that misunderstandings have arisen about
our putative ‘mix and match’ or ‘hybrid’ approach. The
point is that APT is, to some extent, applicable to dif-
ferent approaches. More specifically, we found that the
best way of introducing APT was by taking approaches
that would be familiar to readers and then showing what
possible consequences an APT approach would have
for them. For example, our discussion about how two
theoretical linguistic frameworks, Principles and Para-
meters and Minimalism, might incorporate APT is not the
same as patching together a hybrid theory of everything
(pace Carroll) or, indeed, creating a mainly grammatical
theory (pace Roeper). We return to these points
below.
In what follows, we look first at the commentators’
discussion of APT as an account of language development,
its core role. We then turn to its other aspects –
syntactic theory and processing theory – and then consider
compatibility issues in more depth. We conclude with a
consideration of future directions for research, based on
commentators’ suggestions.
APT and language development
Our proposal is, above all else, an account of language
development, so the natural starting point is provided by
the many comments on this topic. Because the removal
of LAD is at the heart of APT, we begin with this issue
before turning to some more specific points discussed in
the commentaries.
Ironically, our framework began as an attempt to
formalize a theory of LAD, but its monitoring and
corrective role simply dissipated as we developed our
proposals further: The application of Occam’s razor more
or less proposed itself. The mechanisms needed to explain
the nature and use of language appeared to be adequate
to explain its development as well. Hence the concept
of LAD survives only as an abstraction from UG-based
processing operations.
Bickerton is puzzled by our rejection of LAD, because
he considers it simply UG seen from another angle. But
‘LAD’ carries theoretical baggage that is not inherent in
the idea of UG and which, we have argued, has no place
in it. This baggage consists of a set of explicit learning
mechanisms and principles, existing specifically for the
purpose of learning. Our claim that nothing of this sort
exists is one which the typical UG theorist would not
consider obvious and uncontroversial, to say the least. We
obviously share Bickerton’s view that ‘Processing with
the aid of UG seems the only way to go’ (p. 21). But this
is by no means a commonsensical statement expressing
ordinary views of UG and LAD. If the quoted statement
does express his position then, frankly, he should welcome
our proposal as a long-overdue effort to straighten out
pervasive misconceptions.
Carroll rejects our claim that APT is a parsimonious
approach, but her argument largely misses the point. An
argument against our position would seek to show that
we have a level of complexity substantially beyond that
which is needed to explain bilingual knowledge and use
of language, including the processing done by learners,
which inevitably involves very substantial gaps in the
knowledge bases. But Carroll does not even try to do this.
As a result, her argument is sketchy at best and irrelevant
at worst.
MacWhinney suggests that we misunderstand learning
in the Competition Model. This may well be true. Our
discussion was based on several standard descriptions
of the CM (Bates and MacWhinney, 1982, 1987, 1989;
MacWhinney, 2001). In these sources we do not find the
lexical learning that he now describes (‘all learning is
situated within the lexical frames of individual items’
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(p. 35)). Nor do we find the ‘universal and unlearned’
processor (p. 35). What we do find is descriptions of
how English speakers, for example, assign agency in a
sentence, without reference to the lexical content of the
sentence; how this process differs across languages; and
how children learning different languages do or do not
develop certain strategies for assigning agency. Maybe
these are actually high-level ways of referring to purely
lexical learning and the workings of an invariant pro-
cessor, but this is not stated, and the translation is far from
obvious.
Our confusion is made worse by apparently conflicting
statements in MacWhinney’s commentary. After stating
that ‘all learning is situated within the lexical frames of
individual items’, he then says that learners ‘generalize
across verb frames to extract language-specific higher-
order syntactic categories’ (p. 36). Why is this not a
contradiction? And what other generalization processes
does the model assume beyond the learning that occurs
within lexical frames?
Part of the issue is how English speakers assign agency
in a case like ‘The lion glurps the tiger’. The typical
speaker will have no doubt that the agent role should
be assigned to ‘the lion’, despite the fact that ‘glurp’ has
no lexical frame. If learners generalize from individual
verb frames to higher-order categories, do they also
generalize from individual verb frames to a principle
that preverbal NPs are very likely to be agents (establish
a cue strength for word order that is independent of
any particular lexical frame)? The sources cited above
certainly give the impression that abstract principles of
this sort exist and are responsible for assignment of
agency. If this is the case, then the CM does hypo-
thesize an additional type of entity, which must also be
acquired.
We recognize, of course, that we do not have in-depth
knowledge of the Competition Model and therefore may
have misunderstood things. Whether or not this is the
case, we hope that further discussion will clarify the
point.
Turning to some more specific issues regarding
language development in APT, we find several cases
of misunderstandings in the commentaries. Carroll’s
comments on our discussion of child–adult differences
in acquisition suggest an extremely impoverished view
of our proposals. We discussed input competition,
differences in working memory, and output competition
as possible explanations for these differences, and
noted that the answer could well lie in a combination
of these and other factors. Carroll’s rebuttal is that
differences in working memory are not an adequate ex-
planation.
Her other comments on acquisition tend to be sketchy,
and we often find them hard to follow. At one point, she
seems to be saying that, according to APT, learners
can only combine two items in production if they have
encountered that particular combination in comprehen-
sion. This would be an absurd position and we do not
know why she thinks we are obliged to adopt it. No
less confusing is her claim that (because we reject LAD,
apparently) we cannot possibly deal with differences in
the way early and late bilinguals use gender marking
in comprehension (p. 23; Guillelmon and Grosjean,
2001).
Dijkstra and Haverkort say that language development
in APT includes the UG-guided ‘formulation of rules’
in response to repeated input (p. 27).We see this as a
description at a very high level of abstraction, which we
prefer to avoid in this context. What is actually happening,
we suggest, is that items are being written in the
lexical stores, based on the application of UG constraints
to input, and are then undergoing gradual changes in
their resting activation levels through further processing
activity. Throughout, their use is also constrained by UG.
When -ed is first processed as a past tense item, for
example, it is written in the stores as such. Because it is
written as a tense form, UG constraints force it to appear
in the structural position T (Tense) when it enters an SS
representation. Its appearance in this position then ensures
that it will attach to verbs. Its subsequent use with verbs in
production will be contingent on its activation level, both
absolutely and relative to any other potential occupants
of the position. Through repeated use, the level will rise
and so the affix will routinely appear in the appropriate
position. One could see this as the development of a
rule, that -ed attaches to verbs to express past tense,
but we consider this way of looking at the process more
misleading than helpful.
The situation is similar for Herschensohn’s discus-
sion of ‘hypothesis testing’ in APT. We have no such
concept. When the syntactic processor constructs a
representation during comprehension, it inserts I. If it
cannot construct a legitimate representation for the cur-
rent input using the currently dominant feature value,
it seeks to raise the other value enough for it to temp-
orarily take over. Every time this alternative value ap-
pears in the ultimate representation, its resting activation
level will be slightly raised. The result is that one value
will ultimately attain so high a level that it can no
longer be reversed. Throughout, whichever value has so
far proven most useful, most often, controls production.
Calling this process hypothesis testing is, again, more
misleading than helpful. Regarding Herschensohn’s point
that indirect negative evidence is needed, we already
pointed out possible positive evidence (for the processors)
and raised the possibility that the English setting is the
default, obviating the need for evidence.
Finally, Dijkstra and Haverkort suggest that language
development in APT strongly resembles Dynamic
Systems Theory (e.g. Edelman, 1992). We have not had
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time to seriously consider the issue, but the point could be
quite important.1
APT and syntactic theory
In discussing the role of syntactic theory, we should first
emphasize once again that our proposal at this point is best
seen as a prolegomena rather than a full-fledged theory.
The particular linguistic analyses we presented were thus
intended as illustrations of the logic and as demonstrations
that an approach of this sort is feasible. Some of the
commentators pointed out inconsistencies in our selection
of syntactic approaches, which we acknowledge. This
does not imply the advocacy of a theoretically hybrid
model. The principles of APT can be applied to a
(not unlimited) variety of linguistic models, but the full
working out of such applications and the choice of a most
promising one we leave for future research.
So we agree with some of the commentators that in
a fully developed APT model the linguistic assumptions
need to be more explicit, with a more clearly coherent
view of syntax. But we take issue with several related
points that were made. Most disturbingly, there is serious
confusion about the nature of our approach.
Carroll believes that we are proposing a Minimalist
theory, with all its devices and all its constraints. A
similar misunderstanding is found (inconsistently) in
MacWhinney’s comments, though it does not play so
large a role there. We had hoped we had made it clear
that this was definitely not what we were doing. We have
adopted the Minimalist idea that variation is restricted
to the lexicon, but our use of the approach does not
go far beyond that and we do make extensive use of
Principles and Parameters. This seemed a better strategy
than adopting what might have been a sensible option,
namely Construction Grammar, this being preferred by
Jackendoff (2002), since it would then be more difficult
to explain the principles of APT in terms familiar from
mainline acquisition literature. Jackendoff himself adopts
a similar open-ended presentation strategy in explaining
his model in Jackendoff (1997).
In MacWhinney’s discussion of English and French
word order he says we presumably hold the position that
frames of individual verbs and adverbs are responsible
for the ordering of adverbs relative to verbs and for the
problems French speakers have in getting the English
order right. From this premise he infers a logical problem,
that this dependence on lexical factors (‘lexical’ in the
traditional sense) makes parameters meaningless (p. 000).
We were quite explicit about this in our discussion of I:
we follow familiar linguistic accounts in attributing the
phenomena to a feature of I, not to individual verbs or
1 An anonymous reviewer also raised the point, though too late in the
process for us to accommodate it.
adverbs. This feature, with its [strong] and [weak] values,
is a parameter.
APT and processing
Our proposal is also intended to be an account of proces-
sing. This aspect also drew some interesting comments.
Bickerton’s main theme is that we, along with many
others, failed to recognize the centrality of syntax.
In particular, he wants to minimize the role of the
conceptual processor. But his arguments assume that a
great deal of the burden of processing is carried by
conceptual factors, including context, decisions about
whether an analysis is ‘gibberish’, likely referents of
an expression, and apparently the meanings of words.
He also seems to assume that they have nothing to do
with the conceptual processor, arguing that because these
factors plus the syntactic processor can carry the load of
processing, the conceptual processor has little to do. So
his argument is apparently that if one assumes that much
of the content we attribute to the conceptual processor is
actually located somewhere else in the processing system
(where?2), then the narrowly defined conceptual processor
that results has only a limited role. This may well be true,
but we do not see any interesting implications. We also
note that when he discusses syntactic factors involved in
the rejection of unacceptable analyses, he is elaborating
on our account, not challenging it. We said both syntactic
and conceptual factors are involved.
Some of Harrington’s comments on syntactic priming
research are helpful. In particular, he raises serious
questions about whether the effects really have any
implications for APT (and for processing theory in
general), based on their sometimes surprising duration.
We find his interpretation of Bock and Loebell’s (1990)
work less helpful. In particular, his statement that it
showed priming effects from a rejected analysis is doubtful
(p. 30). The authors’ own conclusion was quite different:
when subjects’ processing of a locative sentence increased
their likelihood of subsequently producing passives, this
effect resulted directly from structural similarity between
the locative and the passive, not from the characteristics
of any rejected analysis. And it is doubtful that a passive
analysis was ever produced for the locative sentences used
in the study, as those sentences all involved progressive
verb forms (e.g. ‘The 747 was landing by the control
tower’), in which an incremental processor could rule out
a passive reading before the by-phrase was reached. The
test case we suggested was designed to ensure that the verb
2 The discussion is especially confusing because Bickerton has prior
context, a phone call for example, influencing the comprehension of
a sentence ‘long before recourse to any conceptual processor’ (p. 21).
In a Jackendovian model like ours, this would mean the knowledge
that a phone call was just made is either phonological or syntactic.
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form was consistent with a passive structure. Finally, the
experimental design does not appear to rule out alternative
explanations for the effects, such as priming of by itself.
The weakness of the effect might fit such an explanation.
We are not sure what Harrington has in mind
when he discusses descriptive and explanatory uses of
‘activation’(p. 30). It looks as if he is saying that the
notion can only have explanatory value if we use it as a
literal claim about brain function (we do not). Such a view
would be difficult to understand.
Carroll’s assertion that we cannot possibly deal with
cross-linguistic variation in relative clause attachment
preferences (e.g. Cuetos and Mitchell, 1988) seems to
be based, again, on an impoverished view of APT. Her
argument is that the variation is not lexical (i.e., it is based
on general syntactic structure) and therefore cannot be
handled by APT. On the traditional notion of ‘lexical’ her
premise is probably correct. But, our notion of ‘lexical’,
again, includes the functional categories commonly used
to explain (‘non-lexical’) syntactic phenomena. Her
argument is thus a non sequitur.
It is certainly true that we do not have an account of
variation in relative clause attachment, for a very good
reason: at this point no one can say with any confidence
what the underlying mechanisms of the variation are.
Various accounts are on the market, some problematic
for our approach and some not appearing to pose any
problems of principle. The latter type are those that seek to
explain the variation in terms of formal characteristics of
the languages (e.g. Frazier and Clifton, 1996; Hemforth,
Konieczny, Scheepers, and Strube, 1998). We have not
developed an APT account, but there is no apparent
reason to think that this cannot be done, once an adequate
linguistic account is in place.
Compatibility issues
Our ‘mix and match’ approach naturally raises questions
about the compatibility of the various elements we have
incorporated. But so far at least we see no genuine cause
for concern. To the extent that we do make what appear
to be ‘hybrid’ proposals, we are trying to reinterpret
conceptualizations from different approaches in terms that
make them consistent within our own and, in most cases,
Jackendoff’s model. Several of the commentators express
concern about possible problems. But, interestingly, none
make a case that any actually occur.
Carroll says we seem to need the levels of PF and
LF (p. 23), apparently a corollary of her idea that we
are dedicated Minimalists. We already offered reasons
to believe that the absence of LF in our model causes
no problems of any kind. Carroll does not address that
discussion. Regarding PF, we have no idea why she thinks
a Jackendovian PS will not work in our model, and we
will not speculate on the matter.
Pienemann is concerned about our use of aspects of
connectionism – i.e. activation levels gradually adjusted
through experience – in conjunction with a largely
symbolic approach. His argument is that Pinker and
Prince (1988) showed that symbolic and connectionist
approaches are irreconcilable and so our use of activation
levels should be viewed with suspicion (p. 38). Our
understanding of Pinker and Prince is quite different.
They mentioned three possible views of connectionism,
two of which are compatible with symbolic approaches.
The third, ELIMINATIVE CONNECTIONISM, is not, but this
hardly needed to be demonstrated, as the essence of this
extreme variety is that rules are fictions and the only
reality is the PDP network. This radical view obviously
has nothing to do with our proposal, which maintains the
rule-governed character of symbolic approaches and does
not even include a connectionist network. So we do not
understand Pienemann’s concern.
Dijkstra and Haverkort are uneasy about our use of
activation levels with Chomskyan features. We would
argue that a combination of this sort is not only feasible (no
one has offered any reason to think it is not) but probably
essential. Language, its acquisition, and its use are rule-
governed. They are also fuzzy and non-discrete. Dealing
with this dual nature of language is possibly the most
important – and most challenging – problem facing the
theorist. The use of features that have discrete values based
on a continuum of possible strengths offers a promising
approach.
More generally, if there is ever to be an adequate
general theory, it will have to include reasonable, research-
based accounts of (a) the nature of language, (b) the
development of language, and (c) the use of language.
In other words, it will have to find ways to incorporate
the strengths of linguistics, cognitive psychology, and
psycholinguistics. We believe we have at least taken a
meaningful step in that direction.
What more needs to be done
As we said, our proposal is very ambitious, with the
implication that LOTS still needs to be done. The com-
mentaries provide many useful suggestions.
Dijkstra and Haverkort emphasize the importance of
further developing working memory in the model, and
we agree. Herschensohn focuses on the potential value
of placing morphology at the center of our linguistic
analyses, a suggestion we take very seriously. The possible
connection with Dynamic Systems Theory (Dijkstra and
Haverkort) is also quite interesting. Carroll points out
some issues that are worth pursuing, such as relative clause
attachment preferences and the use of gender markings
in processing, though she chooses to present them as
things APT cannot do. MacWhinney raises the interesting
possibility of a more thorough comparison of French and
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English adverb placement as a way to derive predictions
about transfer. Roeper mentions the need to shed light
on the syntax/semantics interface and the involvement of
general cognition, an area where Jackendoff’s approach
seems particularly strong. Dijkstra and Haverkort point
out the value of connecting APT to neuroscience research
and of dealing with regular and irregular morphology.
Topics that we find especially interesting for further
development, and which came up in the commentaries,
include cross-linguistic influence and the limited success
of L2 learners relative to L1 learners. More generally, the
approach clearly needs more explicit development in each
of its areas, as we have always recognized.
That said, we feel that some of the commentators have
greatly overstated their criticisms in this regard. When the
initial presentation of a very broad approach is at issue,
one can hardly go wrong in criticizing it for vagueness.
But accusations of vagueness can easily become vague
themselves, making the problems look far greater than
they actually are. One example will suffice. Regarding
the nature of items in the lexical stores, we started with
Jackendoff’s rather well-developed notions and went on
to say a great deal about our own versions. In this context,
Harrington’s simple statement that ‘what an item consists
of is not specified’ (p. 29) is quite misleading.
We recognize, once again, that we have not responded
to all the issues brought up in the commentaries and may
not have done justice to some of those we did dis-
cuss. We hope, in future, to be able to deal more comp-
rehensively with the interesting questions raised by all our
commentators.
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